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ARTICLE 
 
 
Investigating Violations of International Law in 
Armed Conflict 
 
 
 
Michael N. Schmitt* 
 
 
On December 27, 2008, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) launched 
Operation Cast Lead into Gaza in an attempt to thwart continuing attacks 
by Hamas and other Palestinian organized armed groups. Military 
operations continued for twenty-two days until Israel declared a 
unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its forces. Allegations of widespread 
human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) violations 
ensued.1  
 
  Among the issues raised in the aftermath of the conflict was the 
adequacy of investigation by the parties into possible violations of 
international law. In Turning a Blind Eye: Impunity for Laws-of-War Violations 
during the Gaza War, Human Rights Watch charged that “[m]ore than 
one year after the conflict, neither side has taken adequate measures to 
investigate serious violations or to punish perpetrators of war crimes.”2 
                                                             
* Professor of Public International Law, Durham University Law School, United 
Kingdom. 
1 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, OPERATION “CAST LEAD”: 22 DAYS OF DEATH 
AND DESTRUCTION (2009), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/mde150152009en.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, RAIN OF FIRE: ISRAEL’S UNLAWFUL USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS IN GAZA 
(2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/03/25/rain-fire; HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, PRECISELY WRONG: GAZA CIVILIANS KILLED BY ISRAELI DRONE-
LAUNCHED MISSILES (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, WHITE FLAG DEATHS: KILLINGS OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS DURING 
OPERATION CAST LEAD (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/85014; HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, ROCKETS FROM GAZA, HARM TO CIVILIANS FROM PALESTINIAN 
ARMED GROUPS’ ROCKET ATTACKS (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/node/84868; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “I LOST EVERYTHING”: 
ISRAEL’S UNLAWFUL DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY DURING OPERATION CAST LEAD 
(2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/90334. 
2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNING A BLIND EYE: IMPUNITY FOR LAWS-OF-WAR 
VIOLATIONS DURING THE GAZA WAR (2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/node/89575 [hereinafter TURNING A BLIND EYE]. Hamas had 
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B’Tselem, an Israeli non-governmental organization, similarly argued 
that because the military, including the IDF’s legal officers, conducted 
most Israeli investigations, the process was tainted, for “no system can 
investigate itself.”3 Perhaps most significantly, the September 2009 
“Goldstone Report,” commissioned by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council President, found that “the failure of Israel to open 
prompt, independent and impartial criminal investigations even after six 
months have elapsed constitute a violation of its obligations to genuinely 
investigate allegations of war crimes and other crimes, and other serious 
violations of international law.”4 The United Nations General Assembly 
                                                                                                                                                   
conducted no meaningful investigations by the time of the report; Israel had conducted 
150 investigations and issued two reports, but Human Rights Watch found them to 
“have fallen short of international standards for investigations.” Id. at 1. For the Israeli 
reports, see STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA, 27 DECEMBER 2008-18 
JANUARY 2009: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (2009), available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/E89E699D-A435-491B-B2D0-
017675DAFEF7/0/GazaOperation.pdf; STATE OF ISRAEL, GAZA OPERATIONS 
INVESTIGATIONS: AN UPDATE, (2010), available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8E841A98-1755-413D-A1D2-
8B30F64022BE/0/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf. In July 2010, Israel 
published its third report on Cast Lead, specifically addressing the status of the ongoing 
investigations. STATE OF ISRAEL, GAZA OPERATION INVESTIGATIONS: SECOND 
UPDATE (2010), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1483B296-7439-
4217-933C-653CD19CE859/0/GazaUpdateJuly2010.pdf.   
In June 2010, the Israeli Government established an independent public 
commission consisting of a former Israeli Supreme Court Justice, a distinguished Israeli 
international law professor, a retired Israeli general, a Northern Irish Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate, and the former Canadian Judge Advocate General (the commission 
was later expanded to include an Israeli scholar and a former diplomat). Although 
formed in response to the Mavi Marmara incident during the Israeli blockade of Gaza, 
the “Turkel Commission” was further empowered to investigate “the mechanism for 
examining and investigating complaints and claims raised in relation to violations of 
the laws of armed conflict … conform with the obligations of the State of Israel under 
the rules of international law.” Government Establishes Independent Public Commission, 
ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/Independent_Publi
c_Commission_Maritime_Incident_31-May-2010.htm. For discussion and criticism of 
such commissions, see Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3 (May 2, 2008). 
3 Israel’s Report to the UN Misstates the Truth, B’TSELEM (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza_Strip/20100204_Israels_Report_to_UN.asp. 
The organization also argued that “[t]he investigation must examine not only the 
conduct of the soldiers in the field but also the orders given them and the policy that 
was set by the senior military echelon and the political echelon.” Id. 
4 Human Rights in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact 
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,  ¶ 1620, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009) 
[hereinafter Goldstone Report]. It specifically determined that “the system put in place 
by Israel…to deal with allegations of serious wrongdoing by armed forces personnel 
does not comply with [all of the universal principles of independence, effectiveness, 
promptness and impartiality]”…and that it “is not effective in addressing the violations 
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subsequently endorsed the Goldstone Report, although the action, like 
the report, proved highly contentious. 5  
 
In light of the controversy, the Human Rights Council 
established a “committee of independent experts in international 
humanitarian and human rights laws to monitor and assess any 
domestic, legal or other proceedings undertaken by both the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian side, in the light of General 
Assembly Resolution 64/254, including the independence, effectiveness, 
genuineness of these investigations and their conformity with 
international standards.”6 Essentially an “investigation into 
investigations,” the committee issued its report in September 2010.7 In 
                                                                                                                                                   
and uncovering the truth.” Id. ¶¶ 1611–13. The report was highly controversial. For 
instance, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning the 
report. H. Res. 867, 111th Cong. (2009). See also Laurie Blank, The Application of IHL in 
the Goldstone Report: A Critical Commentary, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. (forthcoming 
2010).   
5 G.A. Res. 64/10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/10 (Dec. 1, 2009). Of the Permanent 5 
members of the Security Council, the United States voted against approval of the 
report, whereas China voted in favor and Russia, France and the United Kingdom 
abstained. The Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations criticized the 
resolution and called the Goldstone Report biased: 
 
We continue to believe that the Report of the UN Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, widely known as the Goldstone 
Report, is deeply flawed. We have previously noted shortcomings 
that include its unbalanced focus on Israel, the negative inferences it 
draws about Israel's intentions and actions, its failure to deal 
adequately with the asymmetrical nature of the Gaza conflict, and its 
failure to assign appropriate responsibility to Hamas for deliberately 
targeting civilians and basing itself and its operations in heavily 
civilian-populated urban areas. The Goldstone Report is also 
problematic in its many overreaching recommendations and its 
sweeping legal and political conclusions. 
 
U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 39th plen. mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.39 (Nov. 5, 2009). 
The General Assembly called upon both Israel and the Palestinians to conduct 
investigations that “are independent, credible and in conformity with international 
standards into the serious violations of international humanitarian and international 
human rights law reported by the Fact-Finding Mission.” G.A. Res. 64/10, supra, at 2. 
In February 2010, the Assembly reiterated its call for investigations. G.A. Res. 64/254, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/254 (Mar. 25, 2010).   
6 Follow-up to the report of the United Nations Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, H.R.C. Res. 13/9, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/13/9 (Apr. 14, 2010). Of the P-5, the United States voted against the 
resolution, Russia and China voted in favor and France and the United Kingdom 
abstained. 
7 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Laws to Monitor and Assess Any Domestic, Legal or Other Proceedings 
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it, certain aspects of the investigations conducted by both sides were 
criticized.8 
 
Although the Committee’s report summarizes the human rights 
and IHL law bearing on the conduct of investigations, it neither does so 
in depth nor with reference to State practice.9 This article examines the 
legal standards in greater depth. It intentionally avoids the politically 
charged matter of Israeli and Palestinian investigative practices. 
Similarly, it draws no conclusions as to the Committee’s assessment 
thereof. Rather, the goal is more general — to identify criteria against 
which investigations must be judged under international law and, in the 
process, clarify the relationship between IHL legal criteria and those 
residing in human rights law. This broader examination is essential, for 
claims of non-compliance are limited to neither Operation Cast Lead, nor 
to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.10 Moreover, since 
such investigations are increasingly frequent, an urgent need exists for 
practical legal guidance on their conduct. 
   
The inquiry will proceed in four phases. First, the relevant IHL 
will be set forth. Since the lex scripta is limited, an effort will be made to 
identify criteria for investigations that are, or are not, implicit in the law. 
Second, human rights norms regarding investigations will be briefly 
surveyed, as will the relationship between IHL and human rights law. 
The purpose is to determine which body of law applies to investigations, 
and how. Third, the practice of four States (Canada, Australia, United 
Kingdom and United States) will be examined to determine whether 
there are commonalities that can elucidate the extant norms. Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Undertaken by both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Side, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/15/50 (Sept. 21, 2010) (Advanced Edited Version) [hereinafter Investigations 
Report]. 
8 The Committee expressed concern about a purported conflict of interest involving the 
provision of legal advice on both operational and investigative matters by the Military 
Advocate General (although the criticism was specific to the case of Gaza), noted that 
the Israelis should have paid greater heed to victims and witnesses (although the 
committee did not find the human rights standards in this regard as strictly applicable 
to armed conflict), stated that Israel failed to meet its human rights and humanitarian 
law obligations to investigate torture and high level violations, and stated that it could 
not conclude that Hamas had met its obligation to conduct “credible and genuine” 
investigations. Id. at 23–24. 
9 Id. at 3–11. 
10 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROMOTING IMPUNITY: THE ISRAELI 
MILITARY’S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE WRONGDOING (2005) (criticizing earlier Israeli 
investigations); Issue Brief: Getting to the Truth through an Independent Commission of Inquiry, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnestyusa.org/war-on-
terror/page.do?id=1541004 (calling for an Independent Commission of Inquiry into 
U.S. practices during the so-called “war on terror”). 
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article will conclude by setting forth those characteristics of 
investigations that represent not “best practice” or lex ferenda, but instead 
the applicable minimum criteria for compliance with the lex lata. 
 
I.  IHL Requirements 
 
Prior to the First World War, it was generally left to States to 
determine whether to punish their own nationals or captured enemy 
soldiers for violations of the laws and customs of war. The primary 
international remedy for violations was pecuniary in nature. As an 
example, the 1907 Hague Regulations provided that a “belligerent party 
which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case 
demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”11 Following 
the conflict, the Versailles Treaty contemplated the prosecution by 
“military tribunals [of] persons accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war,” and required Germany to 
hand over, on request, all such individuals.12 However, the Dutch 
government declined to surrender the Kaiser for trial, claiming that to 
do so would be a breach of neutrality, and the German government 
refused to transfer its citizens, instead agreeing with the Allies to conduct 
prosecutions before the German Supreme Court in Leipzig.13 Very few 
trials were held and the sentences were disproportionately light. 
 
The experience of the Second World War was dramatically 
different. During the conflict, the Allies made clear their intent to 
prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, including those who ordered 
them.14 Upon termination of hostilities, war crimes trials were conducted 
by the victorious Allies at the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo,15 by occupying powers,16 and by individual 
States.17  
                                                             
11 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 3, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 207 Consol. T.S. 277. 
12 Treaty of Peace with Germany, art. 228–29, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 11 Martens 
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 323, 225 Consol. T.S. 188. 
13 On the trials, see CLAUDE MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
WAR CRIMINALS’ TRIALS AND STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY (1921).  
14 See, e.g., Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, Oct. 30, 1943, 9 Dep't St. 
No. 307(1943) (Moscow Declaration on Atrocities). 
15 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1–3, 
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]; Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, Special Proclamation by 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Apr. 26, 1946, 4 U.S.T. 27, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1589. 
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A. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
 
As importantly, the international community required States to 
actively pursue prosecution in future conflicts by confirming such a duty 
in each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.18 The relevant articles in 
the instruments are nearly identical. They provide: 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions 
for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any 
of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined 
in the following Article.  
 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the 
obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such 
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless 
                                                                                                                                                   
16 Control Council Law No. 10, (1946) (Ger.). The law was promulgated by the Allied 
Control Council, which was responsible for the military occupation of Germany by the 
United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France. The law authorized each 
of the occupying powers to conduct its own war crimes trials independent of the 
International Military Tribunal. 
17 Many war crimes trials were conducted in national courts that enjoyed jurisdiction 
over the relevant offenses and offender (e.g., an offense committed by a national of the 
State or against its nationals). Control Council Law No. 10 set forth procedures for 
such cases when the accused was located in Germany: “When any person in a Zone in 
Germany is alleged to have committed a crime, as defined in Article II, in a country 
other than Germany or in another Zone, the government of that nation or the 
Commander of the latter Zone, as the case may be, may request the Commander of 
the Zone which the person is located for his arrest and delivery for trial to the country 
or Zone in which the crime was committed. Such request for delivery shall be granted 
by the Commander receiving it unless he believes such person is wanted for trial or as a 
witness by an International Military Tribunal, or in Germany, or in a nation other 
than the one making the request, or the Commander is not satisfied that delivery 
should be made, in any of which cases he shall have the right to forward the said 
request to the Legal Directorate of the Allied Control Authority. A similar procedure 
shall apply to witnesses, material exhibits and other forms of evidence.” Control 
Council Law No. 10, id. art. IV.1. 
18 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter GC I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter GC IV]. 
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of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it 
prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own 
legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another 
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High 
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. 
 
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures 
necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the 
provisions of the present Convention other than the grave 
breached defined in the following Article. 
 
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by 
safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be 
less favourable than those provided [for in the Third 
Geneva Convention, Article 105 ff].19 
 
By the provisions, States Party to the Conventions shoulder three 
fundamental obligations: 1) to enact the domestic legislation necessary to 
prosecute potential offenders; 2) to search for those accused of violating 
the Conventions; and 3) to either prosecute such individuals or turn 
them over to another State for trial (aut dedere aut punire). The grave 
breaches referenced in the first paragraph are set forth in other articles 
of the conventions.20  Violations not constituting grave breaches (such as 
misuse of the Red Cross emblem) are nevertheless to be addressed in 
national penal legislation, although there is no treaty obligation to 
prosecute or extradite.   
 
Not every violation of IHL constitutes a war crime. Instead, the 
term “war crimes” refers to violations that result in individual penal 
responsibility of individuals.21 While States have the obligation to ensure 
                                                             
19 GC IV, supra note 18, art. 146. 
20 GC I, supra note 18, art. 50; GC II, supra note 18, art. 51; GC III, supra note 18, art. 
130; GC IV, supra note 18, art. 147. 
21 There is no definitive delineation between the two categories. The Charter of the 
IMT cited the following as examples of war crimes: “murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population or in 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or destruction not justified by military necessity.” IMT Charter, supra 
note 15, art. 6(b). Without doubt, all grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
constitute war crimes. Additionally, it is generally accepted that those offenses set forth 
in Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court amount to war crimes 
under customary law (although the precise parameters of the offenses may differ from 
those in the Statute). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 1, 
2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. On the distinction between war 
crimes and acts that merely violate IHL, see Hersch Lauterpact, The Law of Nations and 
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compliance with all aspects of IHL, only war crimes give rise to the 
obligation to prosecute. For instance, States have the obligation to 
disseminate the Conventions,22 but the failure of officials to do so does 
not reach the level of a war crime. 
 
With regard to investigations, the relevant text lies in the second 
paragraph’s complementary requirements to “search for” persons 
alleged to have committed grave breaches and to try them domestically 
or turn them over to other Parties, an obligation which can be met by 
transfer to a competent international tribunal.23 The International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ official Commentary on the articles confirms 
that the obligation extends to nationals of the State and members of the 
enemy forces, and that the Parties must actively search for, arrest and 
prosecute those responsible for violations as quickly as possible.24 Any 
request for extradition has to be supported by evidence establishing a 
“prima facie case,” which the Commentary interprets as “a case in which 
the facts would justify proceedings taken in the country to which 
application is made for extradition.”25 Finally, the Commentary refers to 
the International Law Commission’s 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind’s inclusion of “acts in violation of the laws or 
customs of war.”26  The reference implies that the duties set forth in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 77 (1944); Yoram Dinstein, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
263–66 (2d ed. 2010). 
22 See, e.g., GC III, supra note 18, art 127; GC IV, supra note 18, art. 144; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflict, art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter AP I]. 
23 International Committee of the Red Cross, COMMENTARY: I GENEVA 
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND 
SICK ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 366 (Jean Pictet ed. 1952) [hereinafter GC I 
Commentary].   
24 Id. at 365–66; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 623 (Jean 
Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter GC III Commentary]; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 592–93 (Jean Pictet ed. 1958) [hereinafter GC IV 
Commentary]. 
25 GC I Commentary, supra note 23, at 366. Should extradition of an accused be 
precluded by national legislation, for instance because of nationality, the State having 
custody of the individual must try that person before its own courts. Id. See also INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: II GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 265 (Jean Pictet ed. 1960); GC III 
Commentary, supra note 24, at 623–64; GC IV Commentary, supra note 24, at 593. 
26 GC IV Commentary, supra note 24, at 588 (citing Draft Code of Offences against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2 (13), in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. 
Doc. A/2693 GAOR, Supp. No. 9, at 9 (1954)). 
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provisions are not limited to those articulated in the Conventions 
themselves, but extend to any war crimes.   
 
Beyond these basic explanations, the Commentary offers little 
guidance in interpreting the articles. In particular, it sets no standards 
for the nature of the investigation that has to be conducted into possible 
war crimes. Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be deduced from the 
text and its accompanying commentary.   
 
1) The articles impose no obligation to conduct investigations to 
uncover IHL violations. Rather, 1) an allegation of 2) a war 
crime is the condition precedent to activation of the duty. 
There is no requirement that the identity of the possible 
offender be known, only that a violation be suspected. 
2) There is no limitation as to the source of an allegation. 
Presumably, the requisite allegation could be levelled by State 
authorities, private individuals, non-governmental 
organizations, other States, or intergovernmental 
organizations. 
3) There is a threshold of certainty below which the obligations 
do not apply, a fact suggested by the lack of a requirement to 
prosecute or extradite absent a prima facie case. Although 
the text refers solely to prosecution, an analogous condition 
of reasonableness logically applies to the duty to search for 
offenders (investigate). Thus, not every allegation requires an 
investigation; only those sufficiently credible to reasonably 
merit one do. 
4) The requirements apply to all violations of IHL that 
constitute war crimes. 
5) The requirement to investigate possible war crimes and 
prosecute those responsible extends to the actions of 
individuals who order the commission of an offense. By the 
principle of “command responsibility,” such individuals are 
treated as perpetrators of the resulting crime, not merely 
accomplices.27 Thus, setting a policy of committing war 
crimes, such as directing forces to target the enemy civilian 
                                                             
27 See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 25.3(b); Statute of the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955 annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, art. 6(1) (Nov. 8, 1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 
annex, art. 7(1) (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; ICRC, I CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Rule 152 (Jean-Marie Henkaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck eds. 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. 
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population, would necessitate investigation and, if 
appropriate, prosecution. 
 
B. The 1977 Additional Protocol I 
 
Between 1974 and 1977 a Diplomatic Conference was convened 
to further develop the law that had been set forth in 1949.28 The 
resulting Protocols Additional (Protocol I for international armed 
conflict and Protocol II for non-international) do not supplant the 
Conventions, but rather supplement them for State Parties to the two 
instruments.29 While Protocol II makes no reference to a duty to 
investigate alleged war crimes, Protocol I builds on the duty to 
investigate and prosecute set forth in the Conventions, which it expressly 
references.30 In addition to listing those violations that constitute grave 
breaches and requiring States to cooperate in criminal investigations, in 
Article 87 the Protocol “operationalizes” the requirements of 
investigation and prosecution. 
 
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the 
conflict shall require military commanders, with respect 
to members of the armed forces under their command 
and other persons under their control, to prevent and, 
where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent 
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this 
Protocol. 
 
… 
 
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the 
conflict shall require any commander who is aware that 
subordinates or other persons under his control are going 
to commit or have committed a breach of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as 
are necessary to prevent such violations of the 
Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to 
                                                             
28 The Conference was convened by the Swiss government and held four sessions: Feb. 
20–Mar. 29 1974; Feb. 3–Apr. 18 1975; Apr. 21–June 11 1976; and Mar. 17–June 10 
1977. 
29 AP I, supra note 22, art. 1.2; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, art. 1.1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. Notably, the 
United States and Israel have elected not to become a Party to either of the Protocols, 
although some of the norms expressed in provisions thereof reflect customary 
international law and as such bind both States, as well as all other non-Parties. 
30 AP I, supra note 22, arts. 85, 87–89. 
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initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators 
thereof.31 
 
Importantly, the ICRC Commentary on the Protocols expressly 
contemplates investigations conducted by the commander, who would in 
such cases “act like an investigating magistrate.”32 The article is designed 
to leverage the internal command and disciplinary structures of the 
armed forces to identify and prosecute offenders. As emphasized in the 
Commentary, “[w]hether they are concerned with the theatre of military 
operations, occupied territories or places of internment, the necessary 
measures for the proper application of the Conventions and the Protocol 
must be taken at the level of the troops, so that a fatal gap between the 
undertakings entered into by Parties to the conflict and the conduct of 
individuals is avoided.”33 Thus, Article 87 imposes a duty on members of 
the armed forces to act proactively in the face of potential or possible 
IHL violations. 
 
Commanders represent the key to implementation. The mandate 
to prevent, identify, and act extends to all members of the military 
exercising a command function, no matter how senior or junior.34 They 
need not be formally designated as commanders according to the 
regulations of their armed forces; the obligations attach as soon as they 
assume a command function. For example, the concept of 
“commander” as used in Protocol I applies to “the common soldier who 
takes over as head of the platoon to which he belongs at the moment his 
commanding officer has fallen and is no longer capable of fulfilling his 
task.”35 Commanders are not only charged with reacting to violations 
that occur in their presence or come to their immediate attention, but 
also with creating a “command climate” that fosters preventing and 
reporting violations.36   
                                                             
31 Id. art. 87. 
32 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds. 1987), ¶ 3562 [hereinafter AP Commentary]. 
33 Id. ¶ 3550. 
34 Id. ¶ 3553; MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW 
RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 528 (1982). 
35 AP Commentary, supra note 32, ¶ 3553. Nor do commanders necessarily exercise 
command only over those officially assigned to their unit. Should a commander be 
temporarily in control of forces during a particular operation or as a result of the flow 
of battle, he or she must ensure compliance with the provisions of Article 87 and other 
IHL norms vis-à-vis such forces. Id. ¶ 3554. For the purposes of the article, a 
commander is also responsible for the actions of “other persons under their control,” as 
in the case of the civilian population in occupied territory or troops of other units 
operating in his or her sector of occupation. Id. ¶ 3555. 
36 Id. ¶ 3550. 
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The fact that legal advisers may be attached to a unit does not 
relieve the commander of responsibility for enforcing IHL. Such advisers 
“are there to ‘advise the military commanders’ in the field and not to 
replace them.”37 Of course, this caveat does not imply that commanders 
must perform all associated tasks themselves; such an obligation would 
be impractical in light of their combat duties. Thus, commanders may 
assign tasks to, for example, the military police and legal advisers and 
rely on them to properly execute such tasks.38 What they cannot delegate 
is the responsibility to ensure compliance with IHL by the forces they 
command.   
 
The State must take measures to impose these duties upon 
commanders and ensure they implement them.39 During the 
negotiations of Protocol I, a number of delegations expressed concern 
that Article 87 might be interpreted as relieving governmental 
authorities of their responsibilities or that commanders in the field might 
“encroach on the judgement of the judicial authorities.”40 Despite such 
concerns, commanders often turn to the courts to address possible war 
crimes.41 As a matter of law, it is incontrovertible that the State 
continues to bear responsibility for implementation, that the duties to 
investigate and prosecute extend throughout the chain of command, and 
that judicial and other disciplinary bodies retain full responsibility for 
performing their functions. The responsibilities are complementary, with 
commanders expected to exercise whatever authority has been vested in 
them within the implementation, enforcement, and disciplinary structure 
of their armed forces and government.42 As with related provisions of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the corresponding ICRC Commentary 
thereon, neither Article 87 nor the Additional Protocols Commentary offer 
                                                             
37 Id. ¶ 3557. The obligation to have legal advisers available to advise on 
implementation of IHL is set forth in GC IV, supra note 18, art. 82. 
38 AP Commentary, supra note 32, ¶ 3563. 
39 Id. ¶ 3552. 
40 Id. ¶ 3562; see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 34, at 527–29. 
41 For instance, as of October 2010, the U.S. Army has court-martialed thirty-two 
soldiers on murder or manslaughter charges arising from the deaths of civilians, 
convicting twenty-two of them (the number excludes those charged and convicted of 
lesser offenses, such as negligent homicide or aggravated assault). Charlie Savage, Case 
of Soldiers Accused in Afghan Civilian Killings May Be Worst of Two Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2010, at A9. 
42 For instance, doing so might involve “informing superior officers of what is taking 
place in the sector, drawing up a report in the case of a breach, or intervening with a 
view to preventing a breach from being committed, proposing a sanction to a superior 
who has disciplinary power, or—in the case of someone who holds such power 
himself—exercising it, within the limits of his competence, and finally, remitting the 
case to the judicial authority where necessary with such factual evidence as it was 
possible to find.” AP Commentary, supra note 32, ¶ 3562. 
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guidance regarding the nature of the investigations that must be 
conducted into possible violations that come to the commander’s 
attention. However, certain conclusions can be derived from them. 
 
1) The responsibility to enforce the requirement to identify, 
report, and respond to violations extends throughout the 
chain of command. 
2) Although the article is framed in terms of commanders’ 
duties, it is clear that the intent was to create a seamless 
system for identifying and responding to potential and 
possible war crimes. Thus, an implied duty of reporting 
violations extends to everyone in the military. 
3) The article contemplates a system of military self-policing 
that complements the broader duty of States to investigate 
and prosecute. It is accordingly proper for the military to take 
action in response to possible breaches. To the extent the 
military, in light of the attendant circumstances, fully 
examines incidents and appropriately punishes those 
responsible for violations, the State’s obligations have been 
met. 
4) There is no prohibition on commanders investigating 
possible violations occurring within their own units or 
committed by others under their control. 
5) The existence of a military justice system or the attachment 
of legal advisers to a unit does not relieve a commander of his 
or her responsibilities to respond to possible breaches. 
6) That subordinate commanders have responsibility to 
investigate and otherwise repress breaches does not relieve 
superior commanders of the responsibility to address possible 
war crimes that have come to their attention and are not 
being effectively dealt with by those subordinates. 
7) The emphasis on the criticality of command as a mechanism 
for handling possible violations suggests that methods of 
investigations that might undermine command functions and 
effectiveness are inappropriate.43   
 
                                                             
43 For instance, it would be unreasonable to impose a requirement to report a possible 
violation only to a superior commander if that commander may have been involved in 
the incident. The duty to report borne by the subordinate would remain intact in such 
circumstances, but other means of bringing the matter to the attention of authorities 
capable of taking action would be acceptable. Similarly, it would generally not be 
appropriate for a subordinate commander to formally conduct an investigation into the 
activities of an immediate superior, since doing so would otherwise undermine the 
superior’s command authority and the command relationship may have a chilling 
effect on the subordinate’s conduct of a full and objective investigation. 
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C.  Customary International Humanitarian Law 
 
The fact that Protocol I is binding as such only on Parties thereto 
begs the question of the customary status of IHL norms regarding 
investigations and prosecution conducted by non-Parties, such as the 
United States and Israel. In its Customary International Humanitarian Law 
study, the ICRC asserts that the principles set forth in the 1949 Geneva 
Convention and Protocol I regarding investigations and prosecutions 
enjoy this status.44 Specifically, Rule 158 provides that “States must 
investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or 
armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the 
suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they 
have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”45 
Although less detailed than the corresponding treaty text, the rule 
generally captures the principles the treaty articles express. 
 
Rule 158 unquestionably reflects a customary norm. Beyond 
the 1949 Conventions and Protocol I, numerous other international 
law instruments articulate the obligation to investigate possible war 
crimes, or at least to prosecute those responsible for them. Examples 
include the Genocide Convention,46 Hague Cultural Property 
Convention and its Second Protocol,47 Torture Convention,48 
Chemical Weapons Convention,49 Amended Landmines Protocol,50 
                                                             
44 It should be noted that the authoritativeness of the study has been questioned and, 
therefore, its determinations should be treated with caution. On the U.S. position, see 
Joint Letter from John Bellinger and William Haynes to Jakob Kellenberger on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 46 I.L.M. 514 (2007). 
45 CIHL, supra note 27, rule 158. 
46 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. IV, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
47 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
art. 7, May 14, 1954, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-1 (1999), 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second 
Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflicts arts. 15–17, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769. 
48 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100.20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
49 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, art. VII(1), Jan. 13, 1993,  S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
50 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Amended Protocol II art. 14, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206. 
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Ottawa Convention on Landmines,51 Dublin Convention on Cluster 
Munitions,52 and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.53 
 
Organs of the United Nations have likewise repeatedly cited the 
obligation to investigate and prosecute war criminals. Indeed, during its 
first session in 1946, the General Assembly called on Member States and 
non-members alike to take steps to apprehend war criminals and return 
them to those States where the offenses in question were committed.54 It 
has since urged States to investigate IHL violations and facilitate the 
prosecution of war criminals on multiple occasions.55 In particular, in 
2005 the General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 
Paragraph 3 of the document provides that “[t]he obligation to respect, 
ensure respect for and implement international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law as provided for under the respective 
bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to . . . [i]nvestigate violations 
effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where 
appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible in 
accordance with domestic and international law.”56 
 
The requirements also appear at the national level. Fulfilling 
the obligation set forth in the Geneva Conventions, most States have 
passed legislation providing for jurisdiction over war crimes.57 
Additionally, military manuals generally impose a duty on their armed 
forces to investigate and prosecute possible war crimes.58 For instance, 
                                                             
51 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, art. 9, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 
1507. 
52 Convention on Cluster Munitions, art. 9, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357. 
53 ICC Statute, supra note 21, pmbl. 
54 G.A. Res. 3(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3(I)  (Feb. 13, 1946). 
55 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2338 (XXII), A/RES/2338(XXII) (Dec. 18, 1967); G.A. Res. 
2391 (XXIII), A/RES/2391(XXIII) (Nov. 26, 1968); G.A. Res. 2583 (XXIV), 
A/RES/2583(XXIV) (Dec. 15, 1969); G.A. Res. 2712, A/RES/2712(XXV) (XXV) 
(Dec. 15, 1970); G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), A/RES/2840(XXVI) (Dec. 18, 1971); G.A. 
Res. 3074 (XXVIII), A/RES/3074(XXVIII) (Dec. 3, 1973). 
56 G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, ¶ 3, A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
57 See, e.g., War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006). 
58 The United States’ Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations is illustrative: 
“Alleged violations of the law of armed conflict, whether committed by or against U.S., 
allied, or enemy personnel, are to be reported promptly through appropriate command 
channels. War crimes alleged to be committed by U.S. personnel or its allies, must be 
investigated thoroughly, and where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. War 
crimes committed by enemy personnel will be reviewed for appropriate responsive 
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a U.S. commander is criminally responsible if “he failed to exercise 
properly his command authority or failed otherwise to take responsible 
measures to discover and correct violations that may occur.”59  This is 
especially relevant in light of the Protocol I non-Party status of the 
United States. 
 
The British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict achieves the same 
result by citing the language of Article 28 of the International Criminal 
Court Statute (to which it is Party) to confirm that a commander 
“becomes criminally responsible if he ‘knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known’ that war crimes were 
being or were about to be committed and failed ‘to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authority for 
investigation and prosecution.’”60 The Manual points out that practical 
considerations reinforce this treaty obligation, for “[f]ailure by 
belligerent governments to investigate and, where appropriate, punish 
the alleged unlawful acts of members of their armed forces can 
contribute to the loss of public and world support, leading to isolation for 
the state involved.”61 
 
Finally, the duty to investigate and prosecute has been the 
subject of agreements between belligerents. For instance, in 1991 
Croatia and Yugoslavia agreed that “[e]ach party undertakes, when it is 
officially informed of [an allegation of violations of IHL] made or 
forwarded by the ICRC, to open an inquiry promptly and pursue it 
conscientiously, and to take the necessary steps to put an end to the 
alleged violations or prevent their recurrence and to punish those 
responsible in accordance with the law in force.”62 A similar agreement 
was executed by the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
the following year.63 
                                                                                                                                                   
action.” U.S. NAVY, NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS, ¶ 6.1.2.1 (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M]. 
59 Id. ¶ 6.1.3. 
60 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
438 (2004), [hereinafter U.K. MANUAL]. 
61 Id. ¶ 6.1.2. 
62 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of International Humanitarian 
Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia art. 11, Nov. 
27, 1991, quoted in CIHL, supra note 27, at 3946. 
63 Agreement between Representatives of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic (President of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President of the Party of Democratic Action), 
Representatives of Mr. Radovan Karadzic (President of the Serbian Democratic Party), 
and Representative of Mr. Miljenko Brkic (President of the Croatian Democratic 
Community) art. 5, May 22, 1992, quoted in CIHL, supra note 27, at 3947. 
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While the obligation undeniably constitutes a customary norm 
for belligerents during international armed conflict, its application in 
non-international armed conflict in less certain. On the one hand, 
Additional Protocol II (non-international armed conflict) contains no 
reference to investigations or prosecution, a curious omission in light of 
Protocol I’s explicit cross-reference to the related articles in the 1949 
Conventions, and their further development in the context of the 
commander’s responsibilities. Common Article 3 to the Conventions, 
the sole provision in the instruments drafted specifically for conflicts “not 
of an international character,” likewise includes no such obligation. Nor 
does the commentary on the article imply one. It should also be noted 
that the ICRC’s commentary to the Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study’s Rule 158 is especially sparse when justifying extension of the 
norm to non-international armed conflict.64 
 
On the other hand, the third paragraph of the Geneva 
Conventions’ articles on investigation and prosecution refers to “the 
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present 
Convention other than . . . grave breaches.” The Commentary confirms 
that the duty to suppress applies to any breach of the conventions,65 
which would presumably encompass Common Article 3 violations. 
Additionally, the conventions cited above in support of the existence of a 
customary norm pertain to all armed conflicts, regardless of character.66 
Perhaps most significantly, the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court makes no distinction between categories of armed conflict in 
either its preambular assertion that war crimes and other offenses “must 
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured 
by taking measures at the national level” or in its mention in the article 
on command responsibility of situations in which a commander has 
failed to “submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.”67 This is particularly pertinent given that 
the Statute’s substantive delineation of war crimes differentiates between 
international and non-international armed conflicts. Inclusion of the 
notion of command responsibility for failure to prosecute in the Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which governs the 
prosecution of war criminals in that non-international armed conflict, 
further supports general applicability to such conflicts.68 
                                                             
64 CIHL, supra note 27, at 609–10. 
65 GC I Commentary, supra note 23, at 367; GC IV Commentary, supra note 24, at 
594. 
66 See text accompanying notes 42–48. 
67 ICC Statute, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 28. 
68 ICTR Statute, supra note 27, art. 6. 
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The jurisprudence of international tribunals arguably supports 
extension of the obligation to investigate and prosecute to non-
international armed conflict. In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia surveyed the 
rules governing the conduct of hostilities during international armed 
conflict and argued that some now applied equally in internal conflicts as 
a matter of customary IHL.69 The Chamber cautioned, though, that “(i) 
only a number of rules and principles governing international armed 
conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflicts; and 
(ii) this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and 
mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the 
general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may 
contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts.”70 The caveat is 
important, for sweeping application of the law of international armed 
conflict to non-international armed conflict is a matter of some concern 
for States which understandably seek to preserve their discretion to 
handle internal conflict as they see fit. Such concern does not manifest 
itself in the case of a duty to investigate and prosecute. States are merely 
investigating and prosecuting violations of IHL to which they are 
subject, an obligation already implicit in the notion of pacta sunt 
servanda.71  
 
Overall, it would appear defensible to assert that the requirement 
to investigate and prosecute war crimes attaches in both international 
and non-international armed conflict. Therefore, there is no basis for 
deviating from the scope of the relevant provisions deduced earlier. 
 
II.  The Interplay Between International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law Norms 
 
A. Human Rights Norms Regarding Investigations 
 
As with IHL, human rights law mandates investigation when its 
norms have been breached. In particular, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which safeguards rights like that to 
                                                             
69 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111–27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
70 Id. ¶ 126. 
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. It should be noted that States differ on the content of the customary IHL 
governing non-international armed conflict. However, this is a different issue than that 
of investigation. Assuming a State accepts a purported norm as binding, it has no 
reason to object to an obligation to investigate its possible breach.  
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life, requires States to “adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.”72 The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 31, 
noted that “a failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of 
violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the 
Covenant.”73   
 
Human rights litigation is in accord. The European Court of 
Human Rights, applying the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for parties thereto, has been 
particularly active in this regard.74 For instance, in McKerr v. United 
Kingdom, a case arising out of the troubles in Northern Ireland, the Court 
held that “the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the 
Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under 
Article 1 of the Convention to ‘secure to everyone within [its] 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’, also 
requires by implication that there should be some form of effective 
official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the 
use of force.”75 The decision set out a number of requirements for 
investigations. Governmental authorities must take “whatever 
reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, 
including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where 
appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record 
of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the 
cause of death.”76 The next of kin must also be involved in the process as 
necessary.77 In its assessment of the adequacy of investigation, the Court 
paid particular heed to the requirement for an independent 
investigation.78   
                                                             
72 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2.2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The right to life is set forth in Article 6.1. 
73 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Re.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). In an individual communication in 
Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, the Committee noted that, “the State party is under 
a duty to investigate thoroughly alleged violations of human rights . . . and to prosecute 
criminally, try and punish those held responsible for such violations.” U.N. Human 
Rights Comm. Communication No. 563/1993, ¶ 8.6, (Oct. 27, 1995). 
74 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
75 McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 475, ¶ 111. 
76 Id. ¶ 113. 
77 Id. ¶ 115. 
78 According to the court, this “means not only that there should be no hierarchical or 
institutional connection but also clear independence.” Id. ¶112. On the requirement to 
investigate uses of force resulting in death, see also, e.g., McCann and Others v. the 
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In Ergi v. Turkey, which involved clashes between Turkey and 
Kurdish rebels, the Court similarly held that “[n]either the prevalence of 
violent armed clashes nor the high incidence of fatalities could displace 
the obligation under Article 2 to ensure that an effective, independent 
investigation was conducted into the deaths arising out of clashes with 
security forces, particularly in cases such as the present where the 
circumstances were in many respects unclear.”79 Importantly, in Isayeva 
v. Russia, a case involving Russia’s conflict in Chechnya, it noted that 
while the precise form of the requisite investigation varies according to 
circumstances, “it may generally be regarded as necessary for the 
persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be 
independent from those implicated in the events.”80 Other human rights 
tribunals have arrived at comparable conclusions.81 
 
Beyond case law, bodies concerned with implementing the 
requirement to investigate in the human rights context have added 
significant granularity to the form of the investigations, especially those 
involving the use of force.82 As an example, the United Nations Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials requires 
governments and law enforcement agencies to “ensure that an effective 
review process is available and that independent administrative or 
prosecutorial authorities are in a position to exercise jurisdiction in 
appropriate circumstances” and to send a detailed report “promptly to 
the competent authorities responsible for administrative review and 
judicial control, whenever a death or serious injury results.”83 Those 
affected by the alleged violation (or their legal representatives) must 
enjoy access to an independent process, including a judicial process, and, 
in the event of their death, the right applies to their dependents.84 The 
United Nations’ Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-
legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions likewise call for “thorough, prompt 
and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary 
                                                                                                                                                   
United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 161 (1995); Kaya v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 324, ¶¶ 85–86. 
79 Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1776, ¶ 85. 
80 Isayeva and Others v. Russia, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 128, ¶¶ 210–11. 
81 See generally Case of the Ituango Massacres, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 148 (July 1, 2006); Case of the “Mapiripan Massacre,” Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 134 (Sept. 15, 2005).  
82 On the norms, and their application in situations of armed conflict, see generally 
Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary 
Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
83 Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1. 
84 Id. ¶ 23. 
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and summary executions, including cases where complaints by relatives 
or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death.”85 They set out 
guidance on the collection of evidence, autopsies, calling witnesses, 
disposal of the body, and the availability of budgetary and technical 
resources.86 
 
B. Applicability of Human Rights Norms in Armed Conflict 
 
It is evident that the requirements for investigation under human 
rights law differ substantially from those elucidated in IHL in terms of 
depth and specificity. Accordingly, an important question arises as to the 
extent to which these human rights practices bear on investigations 
conducted during an armed conflict. Whenever a human rights tribunal 
has authoritatively interpreted a human rights treaty to which a State is 
Party, that interpretation will govern the State’s actions. For instance, 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding 
applicability of the European Convention in armed conflict bind the 
United Kingdom. But what rules generally apply to the relationship 
between IHL and human rights law and how does that relationship bear 
on the legal sufficiency of investigations? 
   
Although both bodies of law afford protection to individuals, the 
foundational logic of human rights law and IHL differ. Human rights 
law, acknowledging that States enjoy disproportionate power over 
individuals, seeks to safeguard them from the abuse of that power by 
imposing limits on its abuse through the mechanism of “rights.” At its 
core is the relationship between the State (and its agents) and those 
individuals over whom it exercises control (jurisdiction). By contrast, 
IHL is premised on a delicate balance between two competing State 
interests—being able to effectively use force when embroiled in an 
armed conflict (military necessity) and the protection of those for whom 
the State is responsible (humanity). The rules of IHL therefore represent 
a compromise negotiated by States, either through treaty or customary 
law based in State practice and opinio juris, over how best to 
accommodate these interests.87 
                                                             
85 Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (May 24, 
1989). 
86 Id. ¶¶ 9–17; see also Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. 
Res. 55/89, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/89/Annex (Feb. 22, 2001). 
87 The classic example is the rule of proportionality, by which an attack may be 
conducted against a military objective even when civilians and civilian objects will be 
harmed, so long as the expected incidental harm is not excessive relative to the military 
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Given their divergent purposes, human rights and IHL cannot 
simply be superimposed on armed conflict, nor are they fungible. In the 
past, some experts argued that human rights law occupied no place in 
armed conflict.88 Today, this view has generally been rejected, although 
it is essential to appreciate that the scope and manner of application in 
armed conflict is nuanced.89 For instance, the United States maintains 
the position that human rights law, absent a specific treaty provision to 
such effect, does not apply extraterritorially.90 And in Bankovic, the 
European Court of Human Rights rejected an application to consider an 
alleged violation of the European Convention on Human Rights during 
NATO’s bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 on the 
basis that NATO did not exercise “effective control” over the site of the 
attack.91 
                                                                                                                                                   
advantage anticipated to accrue from the attack. AP I, supra note 22, arts. 51, 57; 
CIHL, supra note 27, ch. 4. 
88 Contemporary arguments against applicability tend to be more sophisticated. For 
instance, applying human rights law in particular armed conflicts may be objected to 
on the basis that a relevant treaty norm was not intended to apply in armed conflicts or 
that human rights law has no extraterritorial effect, positions that have been advanced 
most notably by the United States. See generally Michael Dennis, Application of Human 
Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 119 (2005). 
89 It has been perceptively pointed out that there are at least three situations during 
armed conflict where it makes sense to apply, to a degree, certain human rights norms: 
occupation, non-international armed conflict, and counter-terrorism. The instance and 
scope of applicability will depend in great part on whether the situation involves an 
incident directly related to the conduct of the armed conflict or one where the nexus 
with the conflict is attenuated. See Watkin, supra note 82, at 2. Thus, for example, 
whereas IHL norms on the use of force will apply to fighting organized armed groups 
during an occupation, human rights norms may govern various forceful actions taken 
by an occupant to comply with its duty to generally maintain law and order in 
occupied territory. By this position, an investigation into the excessive use of force while 
solely performing standard policing duties could be subject to most, and perhaps all, 
human rights standards to which the occupant was, as a matter of law, subject. But an 
investigation into an incident occurring during a fire fight with an insurgent group 
would involve further analysis, for IHL would apply to the incident, thereby making it 
necessary to determine the relationship between the two legal regimes. For an 
interesting, albeit somewhat controversial, discussion of the relationship between IHL 
and human rights, see generally Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, What is the Role of 
International Human Rights Law in the War on Terror? 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 803 (2010). 
90 For example, the position taken by the United States regarding the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Third Periodic 
Reports of States Parties Due in 2003: United States of America, at 109, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). 
91 The Court held: “In sum, the case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition 
of the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it 
has done so when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through 
the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all 
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The International Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed the 
general premise that human rights apply in armed conflict. More 
importantly, it has addressed the manner in which IHL and human 
rights law relate. The Court held in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 
that while the ICCPR applies during armed conflict, the determination 
of when a killing is arbitrary in violation of Article 6.1’s prohibition on 
arbitrary deprivation of life is determined by reference to the lex specialis 
of IHL.92 In other words, the human rights standard is to be interpreted 
in accordance with the specialized body of law designed for armed 
conflict. This relationship was further developed in the Wall advisory 
opinion, where the Court highlighted three possibilities: “some rights 
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others 
may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be 
matters of both these branches of international law.”93 It went on, 
consistent with Nuclear Weapons, to apply the principle of lex specialis. 
Citing Wall in the Congo case, the Court applied both IHL and human 
rights instruments to find Uganda in violation of its obligations while in 
occupation of territory in the Congo.94 Although the latter two cases 
dealt with the unique situation of occupation, Nuclear Weapons addressed 
the conduct of hostilities.  Thus, at least in the Court’s jurisprudence, the 
cohabitation of IHL and human rights law reaches to the very core of 
armed conflict.95 
 
The principle of lex specialis highlighted by the Court represents 
the key to determining the adequacy of a human rights investigation into 
a breach of a human rights norm during armed conflict.96 Lex specialis 
can apply in one of two ways in relation to lex generalis. First, the lex 
specialis may directly conflict with the lex generalis. In such a case, the lex 
specialis prevails. An example that is presently the subject of much 
discussion is a purported duty to capture (if possible), rather than kill, 
                                                                                                                                                   
or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.” Bankovic 
& Others v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom 123 Eur. Ct. H.R 335, ¶ 71 (2001). 
92 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 25 (July 8); ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 6.1. 
93 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9). 
94 Case Concerning Armed Activity on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 216–220 (Dec. 19). 
95 Recall, as discussed above, that the United States takes a very restrictive view as to 
any extraterritorial application of human rights law. 
96 For a thoughtful discussion of the subject, see Francoise Hampson, The Relationship 
between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human 
Rights Treaty Body 90 INT. REV. RED CROSS 549 (2008). 
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enemy combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.97 
Human rights law contains precisely such a duty.98 By contrast, since 
enemy combatants and directly participating civilians constitute lawful 
targets under IHL, until they surrender or are otherwise rendered hors de 
combat, it is lawful to kill them even when capture is feasible.99 In that the 
action occurs during armed conflict, the lex specialis IHL norm supplants 
the lex generalis human rights standard.  
 
That is not the situation with regard to investigations, for they 
are mandated in both human rights law and IHL. This raises the second 
possible application of the lex specilis principle—interpretation of the lex 
generalis by reference to the lex specialis. The paradigmatic case was cited 
above, determining arbitrariness under human rights law by reference to 
IHL. Applying the principle in the investigations context, the nature and 
scope of the IHL requirement to investigate will shape the analogous 
obligation in human rights law.   
 
This makes sense. As noted by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Isayeva, the manner in which human rights driven 
investigations must be conducted necessarily varies according to the 
attendant circumstances; the standards are contextual.100 Obviously, a 
State’s ability to conduct investigations during an ongoing conflict is 
much less robust than in peace time. Evidence may have been destroyed 
during the hostilities, civilian witnesses may have become refugees or 
internally displaced persons, military witnesses may be deployed 
elsewhere or be engaged in combat, territory where the offense occurred 
may be under enemy control, forensic and other investigative tools may 
be unavailable on or near the battlefield, military police may be 
occupied by other duties such as prisoner of war handling, legal advisers 
may be providing conduct of hostilities advice, judicial bodies may be 
distant from the theatre of operations, communications may be 
degraded, travel may be hazardous, and so forth. Most importantly, it 
                                                             
97 The issue is the subject of some debate. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC 
"Direct Participation in Hostilities" Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT. SECURITY J. 5, 
39–43 (2010). 
98 See, e.g., McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 236, where the Court held that “the 
use of lethal force would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether 
deliberately or through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the 
deprivation of life of the suspects without putting the lives of others at risk.” See also 
HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (Targeted Killings Case) 
[2006] IsrSC 57(6) 285, ¶ 40. 
99 See, e.g., AP I, supra note 22, art. 41; CIHL, supra note 27, rule 47. 
100 Isayeva, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 209. 
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must be remembered that the military forces, which may represent the 
sole governmental authority in the area, have a mission to accomplish 
other than conducting investigations. Accordingly, human rights 
measures deemed appropriate in the relative stability of peacetime, such 
as the duty to conduct autopsies, involve family members, or maintain 
strict chains of custody, would generally be ill-suited to the realities of 
conducting an investigation in the midst of combat or its immediate 
aftermath. 101 
 
IHL is, by contrast, sensitive to such factors because it was 
developed by States with the specific context of armed conflict in mind. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to refer to human rights law practice to 
fashion standards for investigations of war crimes occurring during 
hostilities. Not only would doing so turn the notion of lex specialis on its 
head, it would be illogical. Instead, in much the same way that it is 
sensible to have IHL legally and practically inform the human rights 
notion of arbitrariness, and quite aside from the legal requirement to do 
so pursuant to the lex specialis principle, it is practical to apply IHL 
investigatory standards when determining whether the human rights 
investigatory requirements have been met in situations of armed conflict.  
 
In this regard, the Goldstone Report identified four “universal 
principles” of investigations—independence, effectiveness, promptness, 
and impartiality.102 Although the report derived the principles from the 
work of human rights courts and bodies, similar principles surely infuse 
the IHL requirement to investigate.103 The principle of independence is 
reflected, for instance, in the requirement that subordinates not be 
tasked to investigate possible misconduct by their immediate superiors. 
Effectiveness is an implicit characteristic of all investigations. A 
requirement of promptness is evident in the duty imposed on individuals 
throughout the chain of command to report possible violations, for the 
comprehensiveness of the requirement facilitates prompt reporting. The 
obligation to report and investigate possible violations by both the 
enemy and one’s own forces evidences impartiality. As a general matter, 
there is no inconsistency between the broad principles applicable in 
human rights and humanitarian law investigations. The question, then, 
                                                             
101 A word of caution is due. This analysis is not meant to suggest that measures 
highlighted in the human rights context cannot or should not be taken when armed 
conflict is involved. Armed conflict can range from tranquil occupation to high 
intensity combat. What is required under IHL will therefore be case specific. As with 
much of IHL, the only viable standard is one of reasonableness in the circumstances. 
102 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1611.   
103 Human Rights Watch has suggested that the standard for investigations of war 
crimes is that they be “prompt, thorough, and impartial and that the ensuing 
prosecutions also be independent.” TURNING A BLIND EYE, supra note 2, at 7. 
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is how do States translate these general principles into practices 
applicable to situations of armed conflict. 
 
III. State Practice 
 
Although certain features of IHL investigations were teased from 
the extant law in Section I, the lex scripta of IHL fails to fully develop the 
requisite investigatory standards. Thus, whether the IHL standards are 
being applied to assess the adequacy of an investigation into possible war 
crimes or as the lex specialis in a human rights investigation, it is necessary 
to look to State practice to populate the content of the law. 
 
In an effort to do so, the practices of four States will be examined 
— Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.104 
Each of these States enjoys a well-developed military justice system and 
is served by an active and well-trained judge advocate department. The 
four, despite periodic criticism, embrace the concept of rule of law, 
benefit from an active civil society that watches over their actions, and 
conduct regular reviews of the actions of their forces on the battlefield.105   
 
Admittedly, obstacles to the reliance on these particular case 
studies exist. Legal concerns do not motivate all their investigative 
practices. Many reflect policy choices influenced by factors like 
resources, particular political perspectives, international relations, and 
historic experience. The practices may also be mandated not by a sense 
of legal obligation emanating from IHL, but instead by domestic 
legislation or specific human rights norms applicable to the State in 
question (as in the case of the United Kingdom and the European 
Convention). Perhaps most significantly, these four States do not typify 
the vast majority of nations, many of which field no uniformed judge 
advocates or posses the resources on the battlefield to conduct robust 
investigations. Nevertheless, because of their normative maturity and 
sophistication, in addition to the fact that theirs are presently “fighting 
                                                             
104 Both Israel and human rights NGOs have likewise focused on these four countries 
to examine practices. GAZA OPERATIONS INVESTIGATIONS: AN UPDATE, supra note 2, 
21–25 (2010); OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS IN RESPECT OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND/OR HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/gaza/comparative-analysis-
20100810.pdf. However, this article examines the practices of the four countries anew; 
its discussion has been reviewed by senior officers from each of the countries involved, 
although they preferred not to be named. 
105 It should be acknowledged that all four countries are from the common law 
tradition. However, while civil law practices may be different, common law practices 
are equally authoritative and lex lata must take into account both. 
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armies” involved in armed conflicts around the world, the practices of 
these States can be usefully distilled to set a threshold of investigatory 
independence, effectiveness, promptness, and impartiality which will 
comply with the somewhat vague requirements of IHL. Practices falling 
short of these standards, however, do not necessarily fail to comport with 
IHL. 
 
A. Canada 
 
To place Canadian investigative mechanisms in context, it is 
essential to understand that its military justice system is in part the 
consequence of the Canadian military’s traumatic experience in 
Somalia, where in 1993 members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment 
deployed in support of the United Nations Mission in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) were involved in the abuse and death of several Somalis. In 
addition to prosecution of the offenders, Canada launched several major 
investigations that eventually resulted in fundamental changes to the 
Canadian military justice system through amendment of the National 
Defence Act.106  
 
Of particular concern was the system’s independence, both 
organizationally (relation to the chain of command) and functionally 
(performance of judicial and quasi-judicial functions, such as exercising 
prosecutorial discretion). Accordingly, the new legislation separated, on 
an institutional basis, the investigative, prosecutorial, defence, and 
judicial functions by creating the posts of Court Martial Administrator, 
Director of Military Prosecutions, and Director of Defence Counsel 
Services. It also established an external Military Police Complaints 
Commission (MPCC) to investigate complaints from any individual, 
civilian or military, regarding military police conduct, and to consider 
allegations of improper interference in military police investigations by 
military personnel or senior Ministry of National Defence officials.107 
Additionally, in order to create an investigative capability independent 
of the chain of command, the Minister of National Defence established 
the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS), which 
                                                             
106 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (Can.) [hereinafter National Defence 
Act]. In the incident one Somali was tortured and killed, one was killed, and another 
wounded while running away from the Canadian compound. On the investigations, 
see SPECIAL ADVISORY GROUP ON MILITARY JUSTICE AND MILITARY POLICE 
INVESTIGATION SERVICES, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY GROUP 
ON MILITARY JUSTICE AND MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION SERVICES 
(1997); DEP’T OF NAT’L DEF., REPORT OF THE SOMALIA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
(1997).  
107 National Defence Act § 250. 
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reports to the Canadian Forces Provost Marshall (CFPM—senior 
military policeman).108   
 
That the changes resulted from an incident occurring during 
hostilities, albeit a peace operation, renders the Canadian experience 
especially relevant. However, it must be cautioned that the revisions to 
the military justice system resulted as much from constitutional 
requirements in domestic Canadian law. In 1992, the Canadian 
Supreme Court found in the Genereux case that Canada’s General Court-
Martial lacked the independence and impartiality required by the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.109 This being so, any conclusions based on 
Canadian practice must be carefully drawn, for they do not necessarily 
derive from the implementation of international law requirements. 
 
The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual imposes on 
commanders the duty of ensuring that members of the forces they lead 
are “aware of their responsibilities related to LOAC and that they 
behave in a manner consistent with the LOAC.”110 Commanders are 
further required to “suppress and to report to competent authorities, 
breaches of the LOAC.”111 A commander who becomes aware that 
“subordinates or other persons under his control . . . have committed a 
breach of the LOAC” must “initiate disciplinary or penal actions against 
these persons.”112 Those who fail to “take all feasible measures within 
their power” in performing this duty have themselves acted 
unlawfully.113 
                                                             
108 CANADIAN FORCES NAT’L INVESTIGATION SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 REPORT]. 
109 R. v. Généreux, [1992] S.C.R. 259. The case recognized the military justice system as a 
co-equal constitutional partner to the civilian justice system and launched a process of 
increased integration of civilian criminal justice constitutional concepts into military justice. 
Of particular note, it removed the chain of command from many decisions, such as 
convening courts-martial. However, commanders still performed an investigatory 
function, and the charging function was, as discussed infra, shared with the CFNIS. 
110 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE 
OPERATION AND TACTICAL LEVELS: JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL B-GJ-005-104/FP-
021 ¶¶ 1504, 1621.2 (2003). The acronym “LOAC” refers to the “law of armed 
conflict.” It is essentially synonymous with IHL, although it is sometimes interpreted as 
including the law governing when a State may use force as an instrument of its national 
policy. 
111 Id. § 8 ¶ 1621.1. 
112 Id. § 8 ¶ 10621.3. 
113 Id. § 8 ¶ 1622. Although this article focuses on the military system, it must be noted 
that the Canadian Attorney General is responsible for implementation of the Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24. Canadian Forces members 
are subject to the act, but cases have been dealt with exclusively within the military 
justice system for violations of military law. For instance, an infantry officer has 
recently been convicted (sentencing pending) of disgraceful conduct in shooting a 
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Investigations of misconduct can occur through either 
administrative or law enforcement channels. Administrative 
investigations that do not clearly involve criminal actions may be 
conducted by Summary Investigations or Board of Inquiry. A 
commander may order a Summary Investigation into any matter 
affecting his or her command unless a conflict of interest exists or his or 
her superiors are implicated.114 The Minister of National Defence and 
commanders may order Boards of Inquiry.115 More formal than 
Summary Investigations, boards may be convened for serious matters, 
such as aircraft accidents or deaths of service members. Consisting of at 
least two officers, they may call witnesses, receive evidence, and examine 
records.116 It is essential to understand that the primary purpose of a 
Summary Investigation or Board of Inquiry is to inform the commander. 
As such, resulting reports may not be subsequently admitted into 
evidence at trial and statements made by witnesses are excluded as 
evidence against them in a subsequent court-martial.117 They are thus 
administrative fact-finding entities, and not prosecutorial in nature.118 
                                                                                                                                                   
wounded Taliban. Richard Brennan, Capt. Robert Semrau Found Not Guilty of Murder, 
THESTAR.COM (July 19, 2010), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/837505--jury-reaches-semrau-verdict. 
114 CANADIAN FORCES, QUEEN’S REGULATIONS AND ORDERS FOR THE CANADIAN 
FORCES, art. 21.01 [hereinafter QR&O]. See also National Defence Act § 45. 
115 QR&O, supra note 114, art. 21.06. 
116 Id. arts. 21.08, 21.10. Note that civilians may serve on Boards of Inquiry if 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
117 Id. arts. 21.10, 21.16. 
118 As an example, in 2006 a Board of Inquiry was convened to investigate an incident 
involving detainee handling. A rear admiral and two colonels were appointed to the 
board, which had the benefit of numerous advisers (legal, military police, public affairs, 
etc.). The board was instructed to make the following findings: 
 
1. Describe the specific details of the 14 June 2006 incident, regarding a person 
in CF custody, who was handed over to Afghan authorities and then taken 
back by CF personnel; 
2. Identify all reports relating to the 14 June 2006 incident, made through the 
chain of command up to Comd CEFCOM, describing their form and to 
whom they were sent;  
3. Determine to what conduct the words “police did assault him as it happened 
in the past” in the section commander’s notes refer; and  
4. Identify the process and doctrine in place at the time for reporting on 
detainees in Afghanistan, through the Comd TFA to Comd CEFCOM. 
 
The Board of Inquiry was cautioned that should it “receive evidence that it reasonably 
believes relates to an allegation of a criminal act or a breach of the Code of Service 
Discipline (CSD), the BOI shall adjourn; the Convening Authority shall be notified, 
and the matter shall be referred to the nearest Judge Advocate General (JAG) 
representative for advice.” NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, BOARD OF INQUIRY 
INTO DETAINEE INCIDENT—14 JUNE 2006, http://www.vcds-vcemd.forces.gc.ca/boi-
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Should evidence of criminality be uncovered, a Board should adjourn 
and refer the matter to the CFNIS. 
 
The CFNIS enjoys jurisdiction over all persons subject to the 
Code of Service Discipline, regardless of rank.119 Comprised of military 
personnel specially trained in investigative techniques, it conducts most 
investigations of alleged IHL violations since they involve “serious or 
sensitive service and criminal offences against property, persons, and the 
Department of National Defence.”120 Incidents not rising to this level, 
which would be rare, may be investigated either by other military police 
units or the command itself. However, once the incident reaches the 
“serious or sensitive” threshold, as in a case where there is prima facie 
evidence of a war crime, it must be transferred to the CFNIS.121 
 
Military members may report possible violations directly to the 
CFNIS. Reports may also be generated through military command 
channels or referred from outside the military. For instance, in 2007 
Amnesty International filed a complaint with the MPCC regarding 
alleged mistreatment of Afghan civilians. The complaint was forwarded 
through the CFMP to the CFNIS for investigation.122 The following 
year, a Canadian academic at the University of Ottawa filed a similar 
complaint alleging prisoner mistreatment that was subsequently 
forwarded to the CFNIS for investigation, as was an allegation by a 
Member of Parliament that Canadian forces were ignoring sexual 
assaults on young Afghan males by members of the Afghan armed 
forces.123 
 
Although CFNIS personnel serve alongside operational units 
when deployed, they report directly to the CFPM to ensure 
                                                                                                                                                   
cde/bid-ced/co-oc-eng.asp (last modified Jan. 28, 2010) [hereinafter BOARD OF 
INQUIRY INTO DETAINEE INCIDENT]. 
119 NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, THE CANADIAN FORCES NATIONAL 
INVESTIGATION SERVICE (CFNIS), http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/cfp-
ggp/nis-sne/index-eng.asp (last modified Apr. 26, 2007). Jurisdiction also extends to 
Canadian civilians accompanying Canadian forces in the field. See National Defence 
Act, Part III.  
120 NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, BACKGROUNDER: THE CANADIAN FORCES 
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE INVESTIGATION PROCESS, 
http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/nr-sp/doc-eng.asp?id=2960 (last modified 
Apr. 27, 2010) [hereinafter BACKGROUNDER]. 
121 See, e.g., BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO DETAINEE INCIDENT, supra note 118. 
122 2007 REPORT, supra note 108, at 11. 
123 CANADIAN FORCES NAT’L INVESTIGATION SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 20 
(2008). It should be noted with regard to the latter case that Parliamentary Committees 
may conduct investigations on their own accord. 
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independence.124 Throughout the process, and especially before 
charging an individual, the CFNIS receives legal advice from military 
prosecutors, although the CFNIS and prosecutors are independent of 
each other organizationally and operationally.125 
 
Once a charge has been levelled against a military member, the 
case will be handled by the Canadian Military Prosecution Service 
(CMPS), which screens cases for trial, tries them, and handles appeals 
before the Court-Martial Appeal Court (CMAC).126 The independence 
of the prosecutorial function is guaranteed in a number of ways. The 
CMPS is led by the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) appointed 
by the Minister of Defence for a term not to exceed four years.127 
Although a uniformed Canadian legal officer within the Office of the 
Judge Advocate,128 the DMP exercises substantial independence in 
performing prosecutorial functions. For example, while the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG—see below) may issue both general and case 
specific instructions to the DMP, the instructions must generally be 
made public.129 Further, while the DMP is expected to keep the chain of 
command fully informed of a case’s progress, such communication may 
not come at the expense of prosecutorial discretion.130 Similarly, strict 
guidelines govern relations and communications between prosecutors 
and legal advisers assigned to units.131   
 
                                                             
124 BACKGROUNDER, supra note 120. 
125 DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 001/00: 
RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADIAN FORCES NATIONAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE (2009), 
available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/CMPS-SCPM/policy-politiques-
001-eng.pdf. The Policy Directive was initially issued on March 1, 2000 and was 
updated on March 18, 2009. 
126 NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, CANADIAN MILITARY PROSECUTION 
SERVICE, http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/justice/prosecutions-poursuites-eng.asp (last 
modified Oct. 12, 2010). 
127 National Defence Act § 165.1–165.17. 
128 DMP & DDCS are under the general supervision of the JAG by virtue of National 
Defence Act §§ 165.17 & 249.2 (respectively). 
129 NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, CANADIAN MILITARY PROSECUTION 
SERVICE, supra note 126. To date, the authority to issue instructions has not been 
exercised by any JAG. 
130 DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 005/99, 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH SERVICE AUTHORITIES (2009), available at 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/CMPS-SCPM/policy-politiques-005-
eng.pdf. The Policy Directive was initially issued on March 15, 2000 and was updated 
on March 18, 2009. 
131 DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 009/00, 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH UNIT LEGAL ADVISORS (2009). The Policy Directive was 
initially issued on March 15, 2000 and was updated on March 18, 2009. 
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The Director of Defence Counsel Services enjoys even greater 
independence, for there is no provision for receiving instructions from 
the JAG. Military lawyers assigned to the directorate to defend service 
personnel before military courts fall outside the unit chain of 
command.132 Military judges are also independent of the chain of 
command as a direct result of the Genereux holding.133   
 
The senior-most lawyer in the Canadian Forces is the Judge 
Advocate General, a general officer statutorily responsible to the 
Minister of National Defence.134 He or she provides legal advice to the 
Minister, Deputy Minister, and military chain of command. The 
independence of the JAG from the chain of command is mirrored more 
generally by service regulations that provide that legal officers are 
assigned to the Office of the JAG and not to the military chain of 
command.135 Although his or her oversight of courts-martial is limited as 
described above, the JAG remains statutorily responsible for the 
superintendence and administration of the overall Canadian military 
justice and disciplinary system. 
 
B. Australia 
 
Australian Defence Doctrine requires that all Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) members be trained in IHL and imposes the responsibility 
for ensuring compliance with the law on commanders.136 Citing the 
post-World War II case of Yamashita, it provides that commanders will be 
held responsible if they know or should have known that subordinates 
have committed a war crime and fail to punish them.137 This obligation 
implies a duty to investigate. 
 
As a result of a 2005 report from the Australian Parliament’s 
Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence and Trade Committee, the military 
justice system is being comprehensively reformed to, inter alia, enhance 
                                                             
132 NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENCE COUNSEL 
SERVICES, http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/justice/defence-defense-eng.asp#ourlawyers 
(last modified Sep. 14, 2010). 
133 NAT’L DEF. AND CANADIAN FORCES, CHIEF MILITARY JUDGE (CMJ), 
http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp (last modified Sep. 30, 2010). 
134 National Defence Act § 9. For a discussion of the role of the JAG, see NAT’L DEF. 
AND CANADIAN FORCES, JAG: MILITARY LAW, http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/law-
loi/index-eng.asp (last modified July 28, 2010). 
135 QR&O, supra note 114, arts. 4.081(1), 4.081(4). 
136 AUSTRALIAN DEF. HEADQUARTERS, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, AUSTRALIAN 
DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (ADDP) 06.4, ¶¶ 13.2, 13.6 (2006).  
137 Id. ¶ 13.5. 
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the independence of the system.138 The process was complicated by the 
2009 decision of the High Court in the case of Lane v. Morrison. There, 
the Court invalidated the Australian Military Court, which had been 
established in 2007, to try serious cases involving members of the ADF, 
as violating the Constitution.139 Thus, the system described below is 
currently in flux. 
 
As with the Canadian system, possible violations of IHL may be 
dealt with either through administrative proceedings or the military 
prosecutorial system. In most cases, examination of an incident 
commences with the Quick Assessment (QA). Such assessments are 
appropriate whenever “any significant incident, allegation or problem . . 
. comes to the attention of the commander/supervisor.”140 Should the 
commander or other responsible officer determine that an inquiry or 
investigation (see below) may be merited, he or she is obligated to direct 
a Quick Assessment.141 The QA, in which a military member appointed 
by the officer concerned examines the facts and circumstances of a 
matter within twenty-four hours, is the starting point for most inquiries 
or investigations.142 The primary purpose of the QA is to determine 
whether further action is required.   
 
Subsequent action may involve such steps as convening a more 
formal administrative inquiry, transferring the matter to the Australian 
Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS) for disciplinary or criminal 
investigation, or referring the matter to the Australian Federal Police. 
The QA is merely an initial administrative procedure designed to 
quickly gather facts. It “must not prevent or interfere with the immediate 
requirement for notification to the relevant ADF Investigative Service 
(ADFIS) or Code of Conduct delegate, or investigation by ADFIS or 
civilian authorities.”143 In the event evidence of criminal activity is 
uncovered, the matter must be forwarded to military law enforcement 
and legal personnel. 
                                                             
138 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AFFAIRS, DEF. AND TRADE REFERENCES, THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF AUSTRALIA’S MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM (June 2005). On the 
reforms, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AFFAIRS, DEF. AND TRADE REFERENCES, FOURTH 
PROGRESS REPORT INTO REFORMS OF AUSTRALIA’S MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (Aug. 2009), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/FADT_CTTE/Legmiljustice/index.htm. 
139 Lane v. Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230, 236 (Austl.). 
140 Dep’t of Def., Defence Instructions (General), Admin. 67-2, ¶ 8 (Aug. 7, 2007) 
(Austl.). 
141 See generally id.  
142 Extensions may be requested from, and granted by, the investigating officer. Id. ¶ 
11. 
143 Id. ¶ 8. 
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A number of more formal administrative inquiries exist to 
consider a matter. They include:   
 
1) Routine Inquiry, an informal administrative inquiry into 
relatively simple matters; 
2) Investigating Officer Inquiry, a formal administrative 
inquiry involving matters that are more serious, and 
which attach certain privileges, immunities, rights, and 
responsibilities in accordance with the Defence (Inquiry) 
Regulations; 
3) Board of Inquiry or a Commission of Inquiry, a quasi-
judicial administrative inquiry during which, for example, 
civilian witnesses subject to its jurisdiction can be 
compelled to testify, witnesses can have legal 
representation, and proceedings are generally made 
public; and 
4) Combined Board of Inquiry, an administrative Board of 
Inquiry involving the participation of the forces of other 
countries.144 
 
Like their Canadian counterparts, Australian administrative 
inquiries serve a fact-finding function and are not designed to build a 
case for prosecution.145 Typically, they will be ordered by a commander 
and conducted by military personnel detached temporarily to perform 
the inquiry. The aim is to establish what occurred and what needs to be 
done (if anything) to prevent recurrence. ADF personnel can be subject 
to adverse administrative action, which can include termination of 
service in the ADF, as a consequence of such administrative inquiries. If, 
during the course of any administrative inquiry, the inquiry officer forms 
a view that a disciplinary or criminal offense may have taken place, he or 
she must inform the authority which directed the inquiry (“Appointing 
Authority”) to allow consideration of whether to refer that part of the 
inquiry to ADFIS (or the respective Service Police for lower level issues) 
for investigation. 
 
As an example, in 2009 the Australian Chief of Joint Operations 
appointed an investigating officer to inquire into an incident involving 
civilian casualties during an air strike against individuals believed to be 
                                                             
144 Robert Creyke, Dir., Austl. Ctr. for Military Law & Justice, Address at the Defence 
Watchdogs Seminar, 2 (Nov. 26, 2008), available at 
http://law.anu.edu.au/ACMLJ%5CWatchdogs/Creyke.pdf. Defence Instructions 
(General), supra note 140, at C-1–C-3. 
145 On procedures during the inquiries, see AUSTRALIAN DEF. FORCE, AUSTRALIAN 
DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION 6.1.4: ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES MANUAL (2006). 
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implanting an improvised explosive device (IED).146 The officer formally 
interviewed witnesses, including an American service member, and 
considered the rules of engagement, targeting guidance, and targeting 
procedures. He ultimately concluded that those killed in the engagement 
were not innocent civilians but were instead laying an IED, and that the 
attack complied with the rules of engagement and other guidance.147  
 
The recommendations in his report suggest the range of 
measures that might be taken based on such inquiries. The investigating 
officer recommended no further investigation by the Australian Defence 
Force Investigative Service, no administrative action against anyone 
involved, no change to targeting practices, and no ex gratia payments. He 
did recommend that legal officers and command groups receive training 
in kinetic operations specific to Afghanistan.148 
 
As noted, the matter will generally be turned over to the ADFIS 
when criminal misconduct is identified unless it is minor, in which case it 
will be addressed by the service police of the respective service. This 
would be rare in the case of a war crime. The military Provost Marshall, 
who reports directly to the Chief of the Defence Force, leads the ADFIS. 
Its members are also military, drawn from the three services.149   
 
Avenues of prosecution include action through the military 
criminal justice system under the Defence Force Discipline Act and 
civilian prosecution pursuant to legislation such as the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code, which domestically implements the International 
Criminal Court Statute.150 Although the ADF Legal Service, headed by 
a military Director General (one star) and a civilian (two star equivalent), 
generally oversees legal operations in the ADF, it is not responsible for 
the day-to-day running of the upper levels of the military disciplinary 
                                                             
146 See REPORT OF AN INQUIRY OFFICER, POSSIBLE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM 
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT STRIKE AT [REDACTED] AFGHANISTAN ON 28 APR 09, available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1011_redacted.pdf; see also REPORT 
OF AN INQUIRY OFFICER INTO THE SHOOTING OF TWO AFGHAN NATIONAL 
POLICEMEN, 11 AUGUST 2009, available at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/coi/reports/EOF_R.pdf. 
147 See REPORT OF AN INQUIRY OFFICER, POSSIBLE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM 
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT STRIKE AT [REDACTED] AFGHANISTAN ON 28 APR 09, supra note 
146, ¶¶ 38–39. 
148 Id. ¶ 41. 
149 DEP’T OF DEF., AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE FACT 
SHEET, http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/resources/1ADFIS%20fact%20sheet%20-
%20October%202007.pdf. 
150 Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) S 10 (Austl.); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 268 
(Austl.). 
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system.151 That responsibility currently lies in the hands of the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG), a title not to be confused with that of the 
“JAG” in Canada. In Australia, the JAG must be a Federal Court or a 
State Supreme Court judge appointed by the Governor General for a 
term not to exceed seven years.152 Deputy JAGs from each of the 
services, and who serve under the same conditions, assist the JAG. The 
JAG sets procedural rules for tribunals, performs final legal review of 
proceedings within the ADF, and takes part in the appointment of 
Defence Force Magistrates, Presidents and members of courts-martial, 
and legal officers for various purposes.153 The Director of Military 
Prosecutions, who is appointed by the Minister for Defence, oversees 
prosecutions. Like the JAG, he or she is independent of the chain of 
command.154  
 
A number of oversight mechanisms exist to monitor performance 
of the system. While the aforementioned reforms are underway, there is 
a requirement for annual progress reports to Parliament. Additionally, 
the Inspector General of the ADF (IGADF), who is independent of the 
chain of command and reports directly to the Chief of Defence Force, 
reviews and audits the military justice system (both the disciplinary 
system and the administrative inquiries and consequences system). The 
IGADF may also receive complaints or submissions regarding the system 
from any individual regarding matters ranging from denial of due 
process to cover up or failure to act.155  
 
C. United Kingdom 
 
As with their Canadian and Australian counterparts, British 
commanders are obligated to ensure their troops understand and comply 
with IHL. They are criminally responsible if they become aware of a 
possible violation and fail to “submit the matter to the competent 
authority for investigation and prosecution.”156 
                                                             
151 It would be common, however, for the vast minor disciplinary matters to be handled 
by commanders pursuant to their powers as such under the DFDA. In such cases, they 
would be advised by attached legal officers on processes, but not with regard to 
prosecution or defense. 
152 Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, §§ 179–88. 
153 This system is likely to change in the near future if Parliament passes a bill to create 
a Military Court of Australia under Chapter III of the Constitution. 
154 Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, pt. XIA.   
155 DEP’T OF DEF., ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT 
CAN PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ADF MEMBERS, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/organisations.htm (Austl.). 
156 U.K. MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 16.36 (quoting ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 28). 
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Potential IHL violations may be the subject of military 
investigations or of inquiries. Under the Armed Forces Act of 2006, 
Service Inquiries may be directed by commanders and other officers of 
appropriate seniority.157 The inquiry panel receives terms of reference 
by which to conduct the inquiry, which may include incidents that could 
raise IHL matters. Regulations issued pursuant to the Act set forth 
detailed provisions with regard to this process.158 The investigations are 
fact-finding in nature, not prosecutorial. Should the panel determine 
that a crime may have been committed, it is generally required to 
adjourn and refer the case to military law enforcement officials. 
Typically, though, an incident in which suspicion of an IHL violation 
exists will be dealt with by such officials from the outset.  
 
The “Service Police,” consisting of the military police of the 
three services, has authority over all members of the armed forces.159 
The Armed Forces Act requires that any officer who becomes aware of a 
serious offense report it to the Service Police.160 While commanding 
officers play a key role in initially investigating most incidents, they are 
prohibited from investigating serious offenses such as murder or rape. 
These “Schedule 2” offenses must instead be reported to, and 
investigated by, the Service Police (or civil police depending on 
jurisdiction).161 Additionally, once an investigation is launched by the 
Service Police, commanding officers may no longer be involved. The 
Service Police, who are independent of the chain of command, will 
consult with the Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) should they 
consider that there is evidence to support a charge, whether it be a 
criminal or service offense. 
 
In 1996, the U.K. military justice system was dramatically 
revised in anticipation of litigation before the European Court of 
Human Rights in Findlay v. United Kingdom, which subsequently found 
that the previous system violated the European Convention’s Article 6.1 
requirement for “a fair and public hearing . . . by an independent and 
impartial tribunal.”162 Today, prosecutions are the responsibility of the 
SPA, which resulted from consolidation of the prosecuting authorities of 
the three services in 2009. Cases are referred to the SPA by either the 
                                                             
157 Armed Forces Act, 2006, c. 52, § 343 (Eng.).  
158 Armed Forces (Service Inquiries) Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008, No. 1651, reg. 3. 
159 Armed Forces Act, 2006, c. 52, explanatory notes, at 1–4 (Eng.). 
160 Armed Forces Act, 2006, c. 52, §§ 113–15 (Eng.). 
161 Manual of Service Law, ch. 6, annex D–E (Ver. 1.0 2009).  
162 Findlay v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 221, 223 (1997). The legislation 
effecting the revision was the Armed Forces Act of 1996. It has since been superseded 
by the Armed Forces Act of 2006. 
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commanding officer or the Service Police. The Director of Service 
Prosecutions, a civilian, heads the SPA, which acts independently of the 
chain of command in making decisions on whether to direct a matter to 
court-martial and setting the charge that should be brought in light of 
the evidence.163 The Director reports to the Attorney General and 
appoints service prosecutors.164 Service prosecutors are seconded from 
the individual services, but are independent of the chain of command 
when performing their duties.   
 
Interestingly, decisions of the SPA regarding the decision to 
prosecute and the charge brought may be reviewed by a civilian court to 
determine compliance with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 
European Convention. Victims and their families can request judicial 
review, a right which has led to such noteworthy litigation as Baha Mousa  
and Al-Sweady.165 
 
A civilian Judge Advocate General serves as the senior magistrate 
for the military; subordinate magistrates are civilians as well. With the 
exception of the Royal Navy, civilian barristers or solicitors (paid for by 
the member or through legal aid) provide defense services, although an 
individual being tried abroad may ask to be represented by a uniformed 
attorney from another service (to ensure independence from the chain of 
command). A small number of uniformed service lawyers are assigned to 
provide legal advice to service members in matters not involving defense 
at trial, for instance on their options when they are “cautioned” (“read 
their rights”). When performing this duty, they are independent of the 
chain of command. In the Royal Navy, defendants have the option of 
civilian or military representation at trial. In the latter case, the attorney 
must not have been previously involved in the matter at hand. 
Importantly, senior service lawyers, such as the Director of Army Legal 
Services, would not be involved in the decision to prosecute or the actual 
defense or prosecution of an offense. Instead, they give advice to the 
chain of command.166   
 
Outside the military justice system, investigative inquiries may be 
conducted pursuant to the Inquiries Act of 2005, by which any Cabinet 
                                                             
163 Armed Forces Act, 2006, c. 52, § 364 (Eng.). 
164 Id. art. 365 
165 In Re Al Skeini v. Secretary of State, (2008) 1 AC 153 [Baha Mousa Case] (Eng.); 
The Queen (on the application of Al-Sweady and Others) v. Secretary of State for the 
Defence [2009] EWHC 2387 (Admin) (Oct. 2, 2009) (Eng.). For information on the Al-
Sweady inquiry, see the inquiry webpage at http://www.alsweadyinquiry.org. 
166 Multiple interviews by author of senior Royal Navy and Royal Air Force legal 
officers (Aug.–Sept. 2010). 
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member may direct a commission be formed when he or she 
believes that “particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, 
public concern, or . . . there is public concern that particular events may 
have occurred.”167 Individuals appointed to serve on such commissions 
must be impartial and, to the extent feasible, the proceedings must be 
public.168   
 
In some cases, commissions are established after the military 
justice system is seen to fail. For instance, the Baha Mousa inquiry 
involves the death of an Iraqi citizen while in British custody. The 
incident was investigated by the Service Police and brought to trial 
before a military court. Only one conviction resulted (based on a 
confession), while there were multiple acquittals. However, then-Chief of 
the General Staff General Sir Richard Dannatt acknowledged that some 
Iraqis “were subjected to a conditioning process that was unlawful.”169 
Moreover, an internal Army investigation, the Aitken Report, also 
identified systemic failures in the handling of detainees.170 In May 2008, 
the Minister of Defence established a commission to inquire into the 
matter.171  The inquiry is presently ongoing. 
 
D. United States 
 
As noted above, and as with the other States surveyed, the 
United States recognizes the responsibility of commanders for failure to 
investigate possible IHL violations and take appropriate action.172 
Specifically, Department of Defense policy requires that:  
 
All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. 
personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual are 
reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where 
appropriate, remedied by corrective action.  
 
                                                             
167 Inquiries Act, 2005, c. 12, § 1 (Eng.). 
168 Id. §§ 9, 18. 
169 Press Statement, General Sir Richard Dannatt, Ministry of Defence (Apr. 30, 2007) 
(cited in JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-EIGHTH REPORT, 2008, ¶ 
6 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/157/15703.htm
#n12. 
170 BRITISH ARMY, THE AITKEN REPORT: AN INVESTIGATION INTO CASES OF 
DELIBERATE ABUSE AND UNLAWFUL KILLING IN IRAQ IN 2003 AND 2004 10–16 
(2008). 
171 MOD Announces Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, GOV’T NEWS (May 14, 2008), http://gov-
news.org/gov/uk/news/mod_announces_baha_mousa_public_inquiry/100298.html. 
172 See text accompanying notes 58–59. 
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All reportable incidents are reported through command 
channels for ultimate transmission to appropriate U.S. 
Agencies, allied governments, or other appropriate 
authorities. Once it has been determined that U.S. 
persons are not involved in a reportable incident, an 
additional U.S. investigation shall be continued only at 
the direction of the appropriate Combatant Commander. 
The on-scene commanders shall ensure that measures are 
taken to preserve evidence of reportable incidents 
pending transfer to U.S., allied, or other appropriate 
authorities.173 
 
The policy defines a reportable incident as one in which a 
“possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which 
there is credible information, or conduct during military operations 
other than war that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it 
occurred during an armed conflict.”174 The policy intentionally sets the 
standard low to ensure that the chain of command and other U.S. 
officials are fully informed as to any incidents that might possibly 
amount to an IHL violation.175 In other words, this threshold for 
reporting possible violations represents a policy decision, not necessarily 
the U.S. position on when reporting and investigation is required as a 
matter of IHL. The duty to report extends to “all military and U.S. 
civilian employees, contractor personnel, and subcontractors assigned to 
or accompanying a DoD Component,” not just those exercising 
command functions.176 
 
A commander who receives information concerning a possible 
violation must immediately report the matter through the chain of 
operational command and within his or her service channels (e.g., Air 
Force channels).177 The higher level command receiving such a report 
must request a formal investigation by military criminal investigators if 
the matter is not already under appropriate investigation and appears to 
involve criminal conduct, as well as report it to the Combatant 
Command (Central Command for Afghanistan and Iraq) and the service 
                                                             
173 Dep’t of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, May 9, 
2006, ¶¶ 4.4–4.5. 
174 Id. ¶ 3.2; see also Lloyd J. Austin III, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01C, Implementation of the DoD Law of War 
Program, ¶ 5 (2007). 
175 See Dick Jackson, Reporting and Investigation of Possible, Suspected, or Alleged Violations of the 
Law of War, ARMY LAWYER, June 2010, at 95, 98. 
176 Dep’t of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2311.01E, supra note 173, ¶ 6.3. 
177 Id. ¶ 6.4.  
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concerned.178 The Combatant Commander in turn reports the incident 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, 
and the Secretary of the Army (who serves as the Department of Defense 
Executive Agent for such matters).179 
 
It is not entirely clear whether a failure to report and investigate 
renders the commander or other responsible officer a principal or 
accessory to the war crime in question, or whether a separate offense has 
been committed.180 In a Marine Corps case arising out of the Haditha 
incident, the commander was charged with a dereliction of duty (Article 
92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)) for failing to report 
possible war crimes. The case was eventually dismissed on, inter alia, the 
basis that a senior judge advocate advising the Convening Authority had 
participated in the earlier investigation of the incident and therefore 
exerted undue influence on the proceedings,181 but the Article 32 Report 
(see discussion below) found that the accused was derelict in his duty by 
failing to “thoroughly and accurately report and investigate a combat 
engagement that clearly needed scrutiny, particularly in light of [the 
Marine Corps regulatory requirements to do so]. He failed to accurately 
report facts that he knew or should have known and inaccurately 
reported at least one critical fact that he specifically knew . . . to his 
higher headquarters.”182 
 
Unlike the other countries cited, the United States has no single 
system for conducting administrative or criminal investigations. Instead, 
the five services issue many of their own regulations and guidelines for 
service-specific investigations.183 However, since the various processes 
derive from a common body of law and military heritage, and because 
Department of Defense guidance governs each, the investigations closely 
resemble each other.   
                                                             
178 Id. ¶ 6.5. 
179 Id. ¶ 6.6. The Combatant Commander is also responsible for determining “the 
extent of investigation and manner in which a reportable incident not involving U.S. or 
enemy persons will be investigated by U.S. Forces and ensur[ing] such incidents are 
reported promptly to appropriate U.S. Agencies, allied governments, or other 
appropriate authorities.” Id. ¶ 5.11.7. 
180 For a useful discussion of U.S. practice regarding reporting and investigating 
possible IHL violations, see Jackson, supra note 175. 
181  See United States v. Chessani, 2009 N-M Ct. Crim. App. 200800299 U 1, 5-7. 
182 Memorandum from Investigating Officer to Commander, U.S. Marine Corps 
Forces, Central Command, Executive Summary of Pretrial Investigative Report in the 
Case of Lieutenant Colonel Jefferey R. Chessani, USMC (July, 10, 2007), in Jackson, 
supra note 175, at 96. 
183 The five services are: Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy.  
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As discussed, an allegation (reason to suspect) that a war crime 
has occurred obliges a commander to report the matter to law 
enforcement officials. Since allegations can be groundless, ill-motivated 
or purely speculative, this requirement cannot be absolute. A rule of 
reasonableness, commonly applied when interpreting IHL obligations, 
attaches, such that an investigation is required whenever a reasonable 
commander in the same or similar circumstances would, based on the 
information before him or her, suspect a violation.   
 
The Rules for Courts-Martial, which apply to all the U.S. Armed 
Forces, provide a mechanism for assessing allegations for credibility. 
Pursuant to Rule 303, “[u]pon receipt of information that a member of 
the command is accused or suspected of committing an offense or 
offenses triable by court-martial, the immediate commander shall make 
or cause to be made a preliminary inquiry into the charges or suspected 
offenses.”184 The accompanying discussion explains:  
 
[t]he preliminary inquiry is usually informal. It may be an 
examination of the charges and an investigative report or 
other summary of expected evidence. In other cases a 
more extensive investigation may be necessary. Although 
the commander may conduct the investigation personally 
or with members of the command, in serious or complex 
cases the commander should consider whether to seek the 
assistance of law enforcement personnel in conducting 
any inquiry or further investigation. The inquiry should 
gather all reasonably available evidence bearing on guilt 
or innocence and any evidence relating to aggravation, 
extenuation, or mitigation.185  
 
Based on the results of the inquiry, the commander determines what 
further investigation, if any, is necessary, and what military justice 
actions to take. 
 
Other tools short of a full criminal investigation for examining an 
incident include administrative inquiries and investigations. These 
proceedings are especially appropriate in cases where there may be no 
allegation of wrongdoing, but in which, because of the nature of the 
incident, review is advisable. A paradigmatic example is the airstrike that 
causes unexpected civilian casualties despite being executed as planned. 
                                                             
184 Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, Manual for Courts-Martial II-19 
(2008) [hereinafter MCM]. 
185 Id. 
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An inquiry or investigation would allow the facts to be captured in order 
to assess procedures and ensure that the attack complied with IHL. 
 
Air Force practices are illustrative of those employed throughout 
the U.S. Armed Forces. Air Force commanders possess the authority to 
conduct or direct administrative inquiries or investigations into any 
incident regarding their command. This authority is inherent in their 
command position. Air Force policy requires that inquiries and 
investigations be conducted at a level of command that can ensure that 
the investigation is “complete, impartial and unbiased.”186 In most cases, 
a single officer will conduct investigations or inquiries, although they 
may seek advice from specialists, such as those who operate a weapons 
system. In complicated matters, a board of officers may conduct 
investigations or inquiries.  
 
Inquiries serve to find facts in relatively simple or straight-
forward matters and usually result in a summarized report of findings. 
By contrast, investigations are used to examine complex matters. 
Investigative reports typically include relevant exhibits and sworn 
witness testimony.187 Although their results are sometimes made public, 
investigations may be “privileged” in cases involving sensitive matters, 
with release governed by domestic legislation such as the Freedom of 
Information and Privacy Acts.188 Witnesses must be informed of the 
nature of the investigation and those suspected of having possibly 
violated the law have to be advised of their right to either remain silent 
or insist on the presence of counsel while they testify.189 Commanders 
                                                             
186 AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, THE MILITARY COMMANDER 
AND THE LAW 408 (2009 electronic update of 2008 version), available at 
http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-091026-025.pdf. Procedures 
are governed by Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-301, Inspector General Complaints 
Resolution, May 15, 2008, although the inherent authority of the commander, not the 
instruction, is the authority for the investigation. 
187 THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 186, at 403. For instance, it 
may not be feasible to conduct a full investigation into every case involving collateral 
damage to civilian property during an attack, but a commander may nevertheless 
direct an inquiry to document facts and circumstances. Should the commander believe 
that something may have gone wrong during the attack, he or she might order an 
investigation. However, in the event criminal conduct is suspected (e.g., an intentional 
attack against civilian objects), referral to a military criminal investigative agency would 
be appropriate. 
188 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006). 
189 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-301, supra note 186, ¶ 2–45. The right to remain 
silent is set forth in Article 31 of the UCMJ for military personnel and the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for civilians. See UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 
(2006); U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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are required to consult with their servicing Staff Judge Advocate before 
directing an inquiry or investigation. 
 
A commander may not investigate matters in which he or she is 
directly involved, for doing so would violate Air Force policy that 
investigations be conducted at a level that ensures impartiality. 
“Involvement” does not imply that a commander is precluded from 
directing an examination of any possible violation committed by his or 
her unit. Rather, only those incidents where he or she personally took 
part, as in approving a strike in which the question of proportionality is 
at issue, preclude consideration. 
 
Based on the inquiry or investigation, the commander may 
decide to take no action, direct further investigation, refer the case to law 
enforcement authorities, take administrative action such as issuing a 
letter of reprimand, impose non-judicial punishment under the UCMJ 
(which can include punishments such as reduction in rank or forfeiture 
of pay),190 or “prefer” charges against an individual involved; that is, 
send the case forward for trial. A commander with authority to convene 
a court-martial in the case must remain “neutral and detached” and 
thus, is prohibited from acting in any investigative capacity.191 
 
Such investigations by military officers have been conducted on 
numerous occasions in high profile cases during recent conflicts. Most 
notable in this regard were the Taguba Report into allegations of 
detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement 
Facility) in Iraq and the Fay/Jones Report, which considered 
intelligence activities at the prison.192 
  
When an incident reasonably appears to involve a war crime, the 
commander must notify military law enforcement personnel such as the 
Security Forces (Air Force military police) or, for serious matters, the Air 
Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI). The Security Forces are 
typically assigned to the commander’s unit. By contrast, the AFOSI is a 
separate specialized investigative agency that lies outside the chain of 
                                                             
190 UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815. 
191 THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 186, at 156. 
192 MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE ¶ 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf; LTG ANTHONY R. JONES 
& MG GEORGE R. FAY, ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU 
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (2004), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/dod/fay82-504rpt.pdf. The 
investigations were conducted pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for 
Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, Oct. 2, 2006. 
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command. AFOSI detachments, consisting of military and civilian 
investigators, report through AFOSI channels to the commander of the 
organization, a senior Air Force officer. He reports to the Air Force 
Inspector General (a military officer), who in turn reports to the 
Secretary of the Air Force. Only the Secretary of the Air Force is 
empowered to direct the AFOSI to delay, suspend, or terminate an 
investigation.193 
 
Once complete, the criminal investigation is transmitted to the 
commander, who determines how to proceed. The unit commander 
typically prefers charges against the individual accused. Preferral implies 
that the commander has grounds to believe an offense may have been 
committed, not that the charge has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The charges are then forwarded to the Special Courts-Martial 
Convening Authority, a more senior commander who can decide 
whether to direct resolution of the matter by means other than court 
martial, “refer” the charge to a Special Court-Martial (where 
punishment is capped at a low level), or convene an “Article 32 
Investigation” to determine whether a General Court-Martial (which is 
empowered to adjudge all punishments) is merited.194 Based on the 
results of the investigation, the Special Courts-Martial convening 
authority may decide the matter is not appropriate for trial, refer the 
case to a Special Court-Martial, or forward it to a more senior 
commander who exercises General Courts-Martial authority. The 
General Courts-Martial Convening Authority may direct alternative 
resolution or convene a Special or General Court-Martial.195 
 
Commanders acting in their capacity as Courts-Martial 
Convening Authorities continue to exercise substantial influence over 
the matter following trial. In particular, they have the authority to 
approve or disapprove the findings and the sentence adjudged at trial. 
Although the Convening Authority may reject or decrease punishment, 
he or she may not increase it. The Judge Advocate General also 
                                                             
193AIR FORCE POLICY DIRECTIVE 71-1, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ¶ 1.4.2 (2010); See also AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 71-101 
(VOL. 1), CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1999). 
194 Maximum punishments for particular offenses are set forth in the individual 
punitive articles (offenses) set forth in MCM, supra note 184, pt. IV. Punishment may 
also be limited based on the rank of the accused. MCM, supra note 184, at RCM 1003. 
A Special Court-Martial may not adjudge a sentence that includes death, 
dishonourable discharge, dismissal of an officer, confinement in excess of one year, 
hard labor without confinement for more than three months, or certain forfeitures of 
pay. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819. 
195 See generally AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-201, ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE (2007) [hereinafter AFI 51–201]. 
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exercises certain limited authority over post-trial procedures in particular 
categories of cases.196   
 
All commanders are advised by a Staff Judge Advocate and his 
or her staff of military attorneys (judge advocates), who are usually 
assigned to the unit and report to the commander. Judge advocates may 
not act in matters in which they are directly involved; doing so would 
represent a “conflict of interest.” For instance, a judge advocate may not 
offer legal advice regarding investigation of an air strike causing 
collateral damage to civilians or civilian object if he or she was 
personally involved in the mission planning (assuming the mission 
planning advice is relevant to the issue at hand). In such a case, an 
uninvolved staff judge advocate will be assigned to provide legal advice 
to the commander.   
 
Prosecution will generally be handled by judge advocates who 
are members of Special Courts-Martial Convening Authority’s staff. 
They may be assisted by Circuit Trial Counsel, experienced litigators 
who, although formally assigned to a Circuit Trial Judiciary, report to 
the Convening Authority’s Staff Judge Advocate for the purposes of the 
case. The Convening Authority also selects the pool of officers from 
which the “jury” will be formed if the accused elects trial “by 
members.”197  Military judges and defense counsel are assigned to the 
Judiciary and are fully independent of the chain of command. They 
report only through judge advocate channels, ultimately to the Judge 
Advocate General as the senior lawyer of the service.198 The Judge 
Advocate General is also charged with professional supervision and 
discipline of military trial and appellate military judges, judge advocates 
and other lawyers who practice in military proceedings under the 
UCMJ.199 Convening authorities and commanders are specifically 
prohibited from censuring or admonishing counsel, military judges or 
members of a court-martial, and it is improper for any person subject to 
the UCMJ to interfere with court-martial proceedings, findings, or 
sentencing.200  
 
In addition to military mechanisms for investigating incidents, 
numerous other avenues of inquiry exist. Presidential Commissions are 
typically established by executive order to provide advice to the 
                                                             
196 See MCM, supra note 184, RCM 1101–07, 1201–05; AFI 51–201, supra note 195, ch. 
9. 
197 AFI, 51–201, supra note 195, ¶ 5.9. 
198 Id. ¶¶ 5–1, 5–3.  
199 MCM, supra note 184, RCM 109.   
200 Id. RCM 104.   
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President. More common are Congressional Select Committees or 
Investigative Commissions, which may be established by joint decision of 
both houses of Congress or by one of the houses. Congressional 
Standing Committees of Congress may also hold hearings to consider 
issues within their competency.201 Individual agencies likewise possess 
the authority to investigate matters involving their personnel. For 
instance, the Department of Justice Inspector General has investigated 
the involvement of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in detainee 
interrogations conducted in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan.202 
Similarly, the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility 
conducted an inquiry into legal advice regarding interrogations, finding 
professional misconduct on the part of two Office of Legal Counsel 
attorneys (although said findings were not adopted by the Associate 
Deputy Attorney General with authority over the matter).203 
 
E. Conclusions as to State Practice 
 
The four case studies reveal certain common characteristics of 
investigations into battlefield incidents. Numerous cautionary caveats are 
in order. First, the practices are those of States that operate at the high-
end of investigative processes and procedures. Few States can marshal 
the resources necessary to conduct investigations at this level of 
complexity. Thus, while the legal bar may be lower than indicated in the 
following conclusions, it will surely be no higher. 
 
Second, certain of the practices described above result not from 
the mandates of IHL, but rather reflect conduct demanded by domestic 
legislation, judicial decisions unique to the State concerned, or non-IHL 
treaty obligations bearing only on States Party. Sensitive to this fact, the 
                                                             
201 LISA MAGARRELL, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: U.S. 
INQUIRY INTO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 11 (2008). 
202 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S 
INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATIONS OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN 
GUANTANAMO BAY, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ (2009). 
203 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL (DAVID 
MARGOLIS), MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING THE OBJECTION TO THE 
FINDINGS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY’S REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL 
COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON 
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (2010), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf; DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INVESTIGATION 
TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (2009). 
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conclusions seek to articulate legal standards gleaned from practice, but 
divorced from State-specific domestic norms and international 
obligations. For instance, in those systems where the operational and 
military justice functions are separate, such separation is, as explained, 
almost entirely the consequence of domestic legislation and case law 
(such as Genereux, Findlay and Lane), some of which applies treaty norms 
applicable only to States that are Party thereto. When this is the case 
and there is meaningful contrary practice (as in the dual role of the 
service Judge Advocate Generals in the United States), no corresponding 
requirement has been included.   
 
Third, it must be understood that the conclusions set forth below 
are not meant to represent “best practice.” As an example, while there is 
no requirement for making known the results of an investigation, 
transparency, particularly among an affected population, generally 
enhances counterinsurgency operations.204 The Article 32 Investigating 
Officer in the Haditha case convincingly made this point when he noted 
that “[t]hese actions display not only negligence with regard to those 
duties reasonably expected of a Battalion Commander in combat; they 
also belie a wilful and callous disregard for the basic [tenets] of 
counterinsurgency operations and the need for popular support and 
legitimacy.”205 
 
Fourth, practices based on policy choice pervade each of the case 
studies. For instance, all four States have military criminal investigative 
agencies that lie outside the chain of command investigate serious 
incidents, and the United States imposes extensive reporting 
requirements up the chain of command. It is difficult to pinpoint any 
rule of IHL requiring these practices. Similarly, while no requirement 
for investigations outside military channels can be found in IHL proper, 
each of the States surveyed provide for extra-military inquiries, thereby 
demonstrating a commitment to the principle of civilian control over the 
military in democracies. As should be clear, a practice that is not 
technically required by IHL may nonetheless represent a wise policy 
decision. But it is not the law, and thus is excluded from the obligations 
appearing below. 
 
Based on the preceding survey of law and practice, the following 
conclusions are offered: 
                                                             
204 See generally DEP’T OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS & MARINE CORPS COMBAT 
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS, COUNTERINSURGENCY, FM 3–24, 
MCWP 3–33.5 (2006) (“COIN Manual”). 
205 Jackson, supra note 175, at 98 (citing Chessani Article 32 Investigation Officer 
Report). 
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1) The obligation to report applies to all individuals who exercise 
command authority over military forces. That a subordinate 
commander or other responsible officer bears this responsibility does 
not relieve more senior officers of the duty. Effective compliance 
with the requirement necessitates policies extending it to any 
member of the armed forces with knowledge of a possible IHL 
violation. 
2) The obligation to investigate likewise encompasses the entire chain 
of command. The duty may be satisfied by investigations at any level 
of command, but only so long as the investigation in question is 
effective in terms of uncovering relevant facts and circumstances that 
will permit appropriate disciplinary action to be taken. 
3) Every allegation of a war crime need not be investigated. The 
requirement to investigate applies only where such allegations 
appear credible.206 On the other hand, an investigation must be 
launched even in the absence of an allegation when credible reason 
to suspect a violation exists. 
4) There is no requirement to investigate particular categories of 
incidents, such as those involving civilian casualties or damage to 
civilian property. Such a requirement would be impractical during 
armed conflict. Only incidents based on a credible allegation of a 
war crime or other reason to suspect a violation necessitate 
investigation. 
5) Investigations may be administrative in nature. In particular, an 
administrative fact-finding investigation is appropriate where it is 
necessary to assess existing procedures and practices, such as current 
targeting guidelines, rules of engagement and other policy or 
operational practices, or to ascertain preliminary information 
regarding an event, such as the exact time and location of a 
particular incident, the identity of the unit involved and so forth.207 
That an incident may involve a violation of IHL does not preclude 
an administrative investigation. Typically, States employ a 
combination of field investigations, administrative investigations of 
varying degrees of formality, criminal investigations and trials, and 
governmental oversight mechanisms to meet the requirement to 
investigate. 
6) It is appropriate to conduct administrative investigations, including 
immediate in-the-field examination of the facts and circumstances 
                                                             
206 See id. at 99. 
207 Such information may not be self-evident in a situation of intense fighting that 
involves the participation of various units moving in and out of the combat zone. While 
some military activities, such as air strikes, may be documented with video footage, 
manoeuvres of ground forces typically lack such documentation. 
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surrounding an event, to assess the need for further investigation, 
whether administrative or criminal in nature.  
7) Possible war crimes must be promptly investigated. In particular, an 
initial inquiry must be conducted immediately whenever a 
commander or other responsible officer reasonably suspects that a 
war crime may have taken place. The realities of the battlefield, 
however, will often influence the practicable pace of the 
investigation.   
8) The requisite depth of the investigation and its procedural robustness 
depend in part on the complexity of the matter and its seriousness. 
They also depend on the attendant circumstances, such as on-going 
hostilities in the area where the incident occurred, the location of 
witnesses, and so forth. In other words, the effectiveness of an 
investigation must always be judged contextually. 
9) Impartiality and independence are questions of fact. The issue is not 
whether an investigator falls within the chain of command, but 
whether he or she is in fact able to act without undue influence when 
making findings as to possible violations of IHL. Any attempt to 
interfere with the investigator’s actions in order to affect the findings 
is improper. The safeguard for independence and impartiality lies 
primarily in prohibiting wrongful interference, not in mandating, for 
instance, a particular command or organizational relationship. 
10) There is no prohibition on commanders investigating possible 
violations by members of their unit. On the contrary, unit 
commanders are primarily responsible for conducting a prompt 
initial inquiry into an incident. However, commanders and other 
responsible officers may not conduct an investigation into any 
incident in which they have been personally involved. Such matters 
must be referred to a higher command or to law enforcement 
authorities.208   
11) There is no legal requirement that individuals investigating incidents 
be of a particular rank or serve outside the unit involved in the 
incident. Military police serving within the unit involved in an 
incident may conduct criminal investigations. However, as with 
commanders, they must be impartial.   
12) There is no legal requirement that those conducting an investigation 
be trained in investigative techniques or practices. In many cases, 
investigations are optimally conducted by officers with an 
operational background, as they may best understand the context in 
which the incident occurred and the manner of its execution.  
                                                             
208 This requirement ensures the impartiality of the officer directing the investigation 
and preserves the independence of those conducting it. 
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13) The investigative safeguards typically applicable in criminal and 
judicial proceedings do not apply in administrative investigations, 
except as a matter of policy. The differing purposes of the two 
categories of investigations — prosecution and fact-finding 
respectively — undergird the distinction. Fact-finding may 
necessitate expeditious procedures that ensure full cooperation with 
the investigation, but which run counter to such judicial limitations 
as the prohibition on compelling testimony from a suspect.209 
However, in virtually all of the systems evaluated, at trial such 
administrative practices will bear on the use of any information 
obtained. 
14) Investigations need not be conducted publically or their results 
released. Nor is there any requirement that victims or their families 
participate or otherwise be informed of investigative results. To the 
extent this is done, the practice represents a policy choice.210   
15) There is no obligation to conduct investigations outside military 
channels into possible IHL violations. 
16) As the U.S. case study demonstrates, no absolute prohibition exists 
on military lawyers providing both operational and investigative or 
disciplinary advice; the restrictions in the other countries examined 
derive from domestic law and decisions. Nevertheless, it is improper 
for a lawyer to provide the legal advice regarding an incident in 
which he or she was personally involved.211   
17) When an investigation reveals clear and reliable evidence of a war 
crime, disciplinary action must be taken or the case has to be 
referred to criminal investigative agencies.  
18) Administrative and criminal investigations may take place 
simultaneously into the same incident, for they may serve different 
purposes. 
19) States must take action to punish those who have violated IHL. 
Either appropriate disciplinary action (including prosecution) within 
the military justice system or prosecution by the civilian courts 
satisfies the requirement. 
20) Criminal investigations and judicial proceedings involving possible 
war crimes are subject to the same safeguards for an accused, and for 
                                                             
209 For example, it may be vital in the investigation of an attack involving civilian 
casualties to quickly identify the causes of the incident so as to preclude repetition.   
210 In the context of armed conflict, such a requirement would make little sense. 
Sensitive intelligence sources might be compromised, operational tactics and military 
strategy could become public, witnesses may be placed at risk due to their cooperation, 
classified weapons data could be revealed, etc. 
211 For instance, a lawyer who provided legal advice on whether a particular target 
represented a military objective may not subsequently serve as a legal adviser for an 
investigation or prosecution involving the legality of a strike against that target. The 
definition of military objective is at AP I, supra note 22, art. 52.2. 
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the overall integrity of the investigative and judicial system, as would 
apply in peacetime. 
21) U.S. practice suggests that military lawyers who render advice on 
whether to prosecute or act as prosecutors need not serve outside the 
operational chain of command; restrictions on such service in other 
countries result from domestic limitations, not IHL. However, 
lawyers providing defense services to members of the armed forces 
accused of a violation, as well as judges in military trials, must be 
independent of the chain of command.  
22) Senior military lawyers, including an armed force’s most senior 
lawyer, may, as in the U.S. case, exercise professional and military 
supervision over both lawyers providing operational legal advice and 
those responsible serving within the military justice system. Domestic 
norms, not IHL, drive the separation of these functions in other 
States. However, senior military lawyers may not interfere with 
either investigations or criminal trials in any manner that would 
detract from the impartiality of such proceedings, nor may they act 
with regard to any matter in which they are personally involved. 
 
IV.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
The lex scripta regarding investigations into violations of 
international law committed during an armed conflict is markedly 
exiguous. Although it is incontrovertible, as both a matter of treaty and 
customary law, that an investigation must be conducted whenever a war 
crime may have occurred, and that prosecution (or other appropriate 
disciplinary action) is mandated in the event a violation is found, little 
guidance exists in the law proper on the nature of such investigations.  
 
Part I of this article suggested standards applicable to IHL 
investigations that were deduced from the relevant provisions of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I. They 
pertain equally to the customary IHL governing investigations, as well as 
both international and non-international armed conflict. Human rights 
law also applies in situations of armed conflict, although the extent of 
application remains somewhat unsettled. As explained in Part II, four 
universal principles govern human rights investigations: independence, 
effectiveness, promptness, and impartiality. These principles also 
determine the adequacy of investigations into possible war crimes. Since 
IHL is the lex specialis in armed conflict, compliance of human rights 
investigations with the four principles is determined by reference to IHL.   
 
It was accordingly necessary to examine State practice in Part III 
to ascertain how States actually interpret and implement the obligation 
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to conduct independent, effective, prompt, and impartial IHL 
investigations. The distinction between practices derived from IHL and 
those that merely reflect policy choice or the influence of domestic 
norms, including treaty obligations borne by particular States, proved 
decisive in several of the conclusions drawn. Importantly, the criteria set 
forth in Part III are intended to reflect likely lex lata, not necessarily best 
practice. At the same time, given the normative maturity of the States 
examined, as well as their relative wealth of resources to conduct the 
investigations, the conclusions represent the outer limits of the legal 
regime governing investigations. 
 
In light of the current controversy over investigations during 
armed conflict, two points merit particular emphasis. First, investigations 
are required only if there is reasonable suspicion or a credible allegation 
of a war crime having been committed; not every allegation or possibility 
of violation necessitates investigation. Second, IHL does not require an 
investigation that exhausts all possible investigatory options. The sole 
requirement is one that meets the four universal principles. For example, 
while it may enhance independence for the person with authority to 
charge a war crime to operate outside the chain of command, such a 
relationship is not legally required so long as he or she is not subjected to 
improper pressures when conducting their activities. Similarly, while a 
trained criminal investigator may be better equipped to conduct a 
thorough investigation in some cases than another military officer, this 
fact does not render the latter’s investigation ineffective as such.  
 
Any assessment of whether an investigation has been properly 
conducted must also take cognizance of the relationship between human 
rights law and IHL. Human rights-specific procedures such as victim 
involvement or the performance of autopsies have no normative 
relevance to investigations of IHL violations. They may be practical 
measures that in certain specific cases could enhance the quality of an 
investigation, but do not represent legal criteria. Moreover, it must be 
remembered that, as a matter of law, practices that may be legally 
mandated during a human rights investigation occurring in peacetime 
are supplanted by IHL standards during armed conflict. And, of course, 
although particular human rights treaty law, and its authoritative 
interpretation by treaty bodies, may determine how a treaty provision is 
to be applied by States Party in armed conflict, such pronouncements 
have no direct bearing on the obligations of non-Party States. 
 
Those who conduct “investigations into investigations” bear a 
further responsibility for discriminating lex lata from lex ferenda. Indeed, 
assertions of norms that in fact amount to lex ferenda may prove 
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counterproductive to the goal of performing meaningful investigations. 
For instance, some observers have criticized investigations by military 
personnel as nothing more than looking into one’s own possible 
misconduct.212  While impartiality and independence are investigatory 
requirements, so too is effectiveness. An investigator who does not 
understand, for example, weapons options, fuzing, guidance systems, 
angle of attack, optimal release altitudes, command and control 
relationships, communications capabilities, tactical options, available 
intelligence options, enemy practices, pattern of life analysis, collateral 
damage estimate methodology, human factors in a combat environment, 
and so forth, will struggle to effectively scrutinize an air strike. Not 
surprisingly then, and as Part III demonstrates, it is common for 
operational personnel, including commanders, to examine military 
activities.  
 
Similar care must be taken to avoid positing impractical, or even 
dangerous, standards. How, for example, does an investigator interview 
witnesses to an air attack executed beyond the front lines? How are the 
victims’ families notified of an investigation’s findings when they are in 
enemy held territory and have no access to modern communications 
such as the Internet? How does one interview witnesses in the field, 
when they will be killed for cooperating once the investigators depart? 
Who will conduct a prompt investigation into a possible war crime in the 
midst of on-going high-intensity hostilities if not members of the unit 
itself? The point is not that efforts like these are always poorly suited to 
investigations. Rather, they are cited to illustrate that the baseline norms 
for investigations during armed conflict are necessarily different than 
those that could be complied with easily in other situations. 
 
It is hoped that those charged with appraising investigations 
conducted during an armed conflict will exhibit both sensitivity to the 
nature of the conflict in question and fidelity to the governing law as it is, 
not as they might have it to be. Failure to do so will only undercut 
respect for international humanitarian law, as well as the human rights 
norms that incorporate it, on the part of States conducting 
investigations.  
                                                             
212 See Israel’s Report to the UN Misstates the Truth, supra note 3. 
